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The potential military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) carry 
tremendous implications for the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The PRC’s 
military modernization efforts are quickly eroding the ROC’s qualitative military 
advantage. As the PRC modernizes, the possibility for a peaceful reunification 
diminishes. However, if it chooses an aggressive solution for reunification, the PRC 
recognizes that it may have to contend with the United States coming to Taiwan’s aid. 
This thesis addresses the PRC’s efforts to modernize its armed forces. Since 1985, 
Beijing has initiated a dedicated process of preparing the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) to fight future wars. Through detailed analysis of U.S. military campaigns in the 
Middle East and the Balkans, the PRC has implemented new doctrine and equipment to 
help transform the PLA into a superior fighting force. As it modernizes, the PRC is 
developing strategies to force Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Also, the PRC is 
developing asymmetric methods to defeat the possible presence of U.S. forces in the 
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In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party was able to defeat the Nationalists in a 
brutal civil war. The Nationalists, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, evacuated 
their party to Taiwan. Thereafter, the Nationalists and the Communists each sought to 
find ways to reunite the two parties and to become a unified China once again. 
Throughout the past fifty years, the United States has intervened more than once in 
defense of Taiwan. Since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States has never 
officially pledged its support in defense of Taiwan, but continues to support Taiwan 
principally in the form of its naval presence and arms sales. The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) understands the significance of United States and Western technology and 
is taking steps to address it.  
 Although Taiwan in recent years has taken a less direct approach to independence 
from the PRC, it continues to receive military support from the United States. The PRC 
sees these arms shipments as a clear violation of its national sovereignty and making 
reunification increasingly difficult.1 The PRC began the modernization of its military in 
1985 not only to become a better fighting force, but also to prepare to make credible its 
threat to use military force against Taiwan. In the past eighteen years, the PRC has made 
significant strides in transforming its military from an obsolete, large manpower-
intensive force to a more technologically advanced, specially trained military. The PRC 
still needs to achieve numerous advances in its military to successfully invade Taiwan, 
but it is well underway to achieving that objective.  
 The military build-up of the PRC near the Taiwan Strait has given analysts 
several possible scenarios. The recent build-up of short-range ballistic missiles and the 
missile tests off the coast of Taiwan show that the PRC is in a position to use these 
missiles against airfields, naval bases and communications centers.2 A preliminary 
                                                 
1 Jamestown Foundation, “On Taiwan, Beijing Knows Exactly What it is Doing,” 8 November 2001, 
china.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwe_001_009_002.htm. 10 January  2003. 
2 Boston Herald, “New Pentagon Report See Danger to Taiwan in China’s Military Modernization”, 12 July 2002, 




missile attack could eliminate the qualitative edge Taiwan has over the PRC. Due to the 
introduction of missile defense into the region by the United States, however, the PRC 
knows it cannot rely solely on this strategy to achieve victory. Purchases of long-range 
fighters, Russian destroyers and submarines allow the PRC to conduct a possible 
blockade of the Taiwan Strait before any invasion takes place.3  China knows it does not 
have properly trained amphibious forces or air-support to achieve a successful invasion in 
the short term, but it continues to modernize its military towards that capability. 
B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. INTERESTS 
 It is important for the United States to understand the actions of the PRC in their 
effort to modernize its military. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including its Navy 
and Air Force, is becoming more technologically advanced. Even though the funds are 
not abundantly available, the PRC has a clear and distinct path it wants to take its 
military. The PRC wants to ensure that no security risk can go unchallenged. In the eyes 
of the PRC, until reunification, Taiwan remains the biggest issue its military may have to 
address. 
C. THESIS QUESTION   
This thesis will examine the implications of China’s military modernizations for 
Taiwan. It will assess which factors the PRC needs to achieve its objectives.  Also, it will 
assess the level of modernization undertaken by the PLA and its ability to conduct 
successful operations against Taiwan. Finally, the thesis will show what actions the PRC 
has taken to thwart the possible intervention of the United States. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II will offer a brief introduction to the division of the PRC and Taiwan. 
Also, it will examine the history of relations between the countries and why the United 
States and other countries in the region worry about the modernization of China’s 
military.4 
                                                 
3 S.C. Chang, “A Sea of Danger Surrounds Taiwan,” 26 March 2002, www.fas.org/news/taiwan/2000/e-03-27-00-
7.htm. 9 September 2002. 
4 Robert G. Sutter, “China Policy: Crisis Over Taiwan,” in Taiwan-China: A Most Ticklish Standoff, ed. Adam W. 




Chapter III will present the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN). Currently, the PLAN does not have a sufficient capacity to conduct a successful 
amphibious assault. Not only does the PLAN not have adequate training, but also the 
terrain and waterways surrounding Taiwan make an amphibious assault extremely risky.5 
However, recent purchases of Russian destroyers and submarines may allow for 
alternative actions to invasion. Naval blockades and trade restrictions may prove to be 
one of China’s more viable alternatives to a costly invasion. 
Chapter IV will present the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Air 
Force (PLAAF). Even before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the PLAAF recognized its 
qualitatively inferior aircraft were no match for Taiwan’s Air Force. Since the Gulf War, 
the PLAAF has taken measures to not only destroy large numbers of its obsolete aircraft, 
but began the purchase of newer aircraft. Also, the PLAAF’s airborne assault troops and 
the purchase of long-range troop carriers needed to conduct such an operation will be 
discussed.6   
Chapter V will present the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army 
Second Artillery Corps. The Second Artillery Corps is most modern force in the PLA. 
The majority of the missiles in the Second Artillery Corps are aimed at Taiwan and 
increasing in number daily. Also, the Second Artillery Corps is modernizing its nuclear 
inventory in a hope to deter the United States from assisting Taiwan. 
Chapter VI will present the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. The 
PLA has changed in size and doctrine dramatically over the past eighteen years. Due to 
numerous military defeats and the success of the United Nations coalition during the Gulf 
War, the PLA knew it needed a drastic change in order to fight more effectively at home 
and against Taiwan. Numerous changes in doctrine forced the PLA to become a sleeker, 
more responsive fighting force. Joint warfare has become one of the most important 
training evolutions in the modernization of the PLA. The PLA recognizes that it is the 
                                                 
5 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 154-6. 
6 Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization,” in People’s Liberation Army After Next, ed. 




most efficient way to gain success on the battlefield and continually trains to achieve it.7 
The chapter will also discuss several other modernization projects of the PLA. 
Chapter VII will assess the potential responses by the PRC towards the U.S. 
military in a Taiwan crisis. The PRC has two plausible scenarios for aggressive 
reunification: an amphibious assault and a naval blockade. Both scenarios provide two 
distinctly different outcomes for Taiwan’s capitulation. The PRC is assuming the United 
States will help Taiwan and is currently developing asymmetric methods in order to 
defeat the United States.  
The conclusion will summarize the points raised throughout the thesis. Also, it 
will discuss where the PRC may stand militarily and diplomatically if aggressive action is 
















                                                 
7 Paul H.B. Godwin, “The PLA faces the Twenty-First Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy 
and Operations” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, 39-63 (Washington, 




II.  PRC-ROC RELATIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since 1949, both the Nationalists on Taiwan and the Communists on mainland 
China have sought ways to once again unify China. In preparation for reunification, both 
the Communists and the Nationalists built up their militaries. When the government on 
Taiwan finally understood that it was no match for the People’s Republic of China’s 
(PRC) quantitative superiority and could not successfully invade the mainland, the 
Republic of China (ROC) began an international call that it was the one true government 
of China. In 1954, Washington and Taiwan signed the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty 
and allowed the ROC to achieve a qualitative military edge over the PRC relatively 
quickly. As advanced U.S. military equipment was staged on Taiwan and after the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in combat in Korea and Vietnam, and with the 
Soviet Union, the PRC understood its military was seriously obsolete and in the 1980s 
began modernization programs for all its forces. The PRC intends to acquire hi-tech 
foreign military equipment, but also to establish its own infrastructure to build advanced 
equipment and ensure only minimal reliance on foreign military goods. Due PRC 
international requests to stop interfering with Taiwan and the PRC’s efforts to modernize, 
the qualitative edge the ROC military forces once had over the PRC forces is 
diminishing.8 As the PLA transforms itself into a modern force, the stability of the Asian-
Pacific region comes into question. If the PRC leadership continues on its current path, 
the PLA will not only be in position to rival every military power in the region, but also 
will possess the ability to force the ROC to reunify. This chapter discusses the turbulent 
relations between the ROC and the PRC and the threat a modernized PLA poses to the 
Asian-Pacific region and the U.S. military.  
B.  HISTORY OF PRC-ROC RELATIONS 
Throughout their fifty-four year history, the relations between the PRC and the 
ROC have been less than cordial. Each government has sought ways to reunify the two 
                                                 
8 David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” The Washington Quarterly 




countries by both diplomatic and military means. Since the late 1990s, the ROC has 
pursued an indirect approach to independence, but seeks it nonetheless. The PRC has no 
desire to see an independent Taiwan, and professes this fact emphatically to the 
international community. In its 2002 National Defense White Paper, the PRC discusses 
the leadership on Taiwan as the greatest threat to peace in the region and Taiwan’s 
inability to accept the “one China” principle as one of the main roadblocks to regional 
stability.9 The views of both the PRC and the ROC over exactly which is the legitimate 
China were formulated over fifty years of turbulent politics. Several historic events 
shaped the evolution of the ROC’s claim as the artificial legitimate government of China 
and the “one China” principle promulgated by the PRC in the international arena. 
 During the Korean War, the ROC became one of the main focuses of U.S. 
foreign policy in Asia. At the start of the Korean War, the United States decided not to 
recognize the PRC and favor the government on Taiwan due to the rise of Communism 
on the mainland and the Cold War with the Soviet Union beginning to take shape around 
the world. The United States believed the PRC would take advantage of the combat in 
Korea and invade Taiwan to reunify the two territories. The US also had similar beliefs 
about the Soviet Union invading Europe during the war and assumed that the Soviet 
Union and the PRC worked closely together. Assuming possible PRC aggression, 
President Harry Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait in an 
effort to neutralize the PRC from invading Taiwan and to prevent the ROC from 
attacking the mainland.10 After three years of patrols in the Taiwan Strait, the presence of 
the Seventh Fleet was deemed effective by President Dwight Eisenhower and he ceased 
the patrol in 1954. The end to the Seventh Fleet patrol was far from the end to trouble in 





                                                 
9 See the full text of the PRC’s 2002 White Paper on China’s National Defense, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 
9 December 2002, in FBIS-2002-1209.  
10 Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President,” 27 June 1950. 





Figure 1.   Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/taiwan-geo.htm. 
 
After the Korean War, the PRC and ROC were involved in two Taiwan Strait 
Crises. The first crisis began in 1954. The ROC saw an opportunity to intensify 
harassment attacks against the PRC and gain possession of the unclaimed Pescadores 
Islands. The PRC took the ROC actions as aggression towards the mainland and began 
shelling the Taiwan coast. The United States, in response to the PRC, signed the US-
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The treaty was an ambiguous response by not 
directly stating what the United States would do in the event of PRC aggression. With the 
treaty so ambiguous, the PRC attacked ROC troops on Yijiang Island.11 Chiang Kai-shek 
mobilized his best equipped troops to defend Yijiang Island and professed once again that 
Taiwan was the legitimate government of China. President Eisenhower validated 
                                                 
11 Chi Huang, Woosang Kim and Samuel S.G. Wu, “Rivalry between the ROC and the PRC,” in Inherited 
Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits, eds. Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang and Samuels S.G. Wu, 25-37 (Boulder: 




Chiang’s perspective regarding Taiwan by passing the Formosa Resolution. Fearing a 
significant blow to Nationalist freedom, this resolution committed U.S. military forces to 
defending Taiwan and the surrounding areas if the PRC attacked.12 The commitment of 
U.S. forces to the defense of Taiwan, and pressure from the Soviet Union, forced the 
PRC to stop shelling Taiwan. 
The second Taiwan Strait crisis occurred in 1958 and marked a significant 
defense policy change for the PRC. Until 1958, the PRC received military and economic 
aid from the Soviet Union. By doing so, it was assumed, the PRC followed defense 
policies congruent with the Soviet Union’s own policies. With political ties between the 
Soviet Union and the PRC now quickly disintegrating, the PRC wanted to show its power 
independent from its ally.13 In addition to the Pescadores Islands, the PRC was angry 
over Taiwan’s occupation of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands.14 In August 1958, the PRC 
once again began to shell ROC-controlled territories. The Nationalists responded by 
bombarding the PRC guns with the jet aircraft provided by the United States. While the 
ROC counterattacks were effective, poor PLA logistics could not sustain the shelling 
with the amount of ammunition available and ceased combat operations. Although unable 
to secure these islands, the PRC sent a message to the Soviet Union and the region, that 
its defense policies were their own to form and implement.  
Harassment attacks and military threats between the PRC and ROC continued 
throughout the 1960s, but in 1969, an event unrelated to Taiwan forced PRC-ROC 
tensions to sway in the PRC’s favor. In 1969, the Soviet Union became the PRC’s 
number one enemy after the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia and by engaging 
China in a border conflict in 1969. Mao Zedong publicly no longer saw the United States 
or Taiwan as immediate threats to China. Mao saw the United States and the Soviet 
Union as equally evil, but only the Soviet Union shared a border with China. Mao saw 
the border conflict with the Soviet Union as necessitating a tactical accommodation with 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 34. 
13 Harvey Nelsen, “Continuity and Change in Chinese Strategic Deterrence,” in Chinese Defense and Foreign 
Policy, eds. June Teufel Dreyer and Ilpyong J. Kim, 239-267. (New York: Paragon House, 1988), pp. 239-252. 
14 Martin L. Lasater and Peter Kien-hong Yu, Taiwan’s Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era (London: Frank 




another enemy of the Soviet Union and possibly as an opportunity to end the PRC 
troubles with Taiwan.15 As normalization talks began, Mao changed his rhetoric towards 
Taiwan from purely militaristic to a mixture of peace initiatives and military threats that 
allowed a Sino-US détente to emerge. It also marked the beginning of the end of 
international recognition of Taiwan’s claims of being the legitimate Chinese 
government.16 Mao impressed upon the United States that Taiwan was no longer a major 
issue and that the Soviet Union was their common enemy and concern. This U.S. policy 
shift proved extremely beneficial to the PRC.  
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took control of the PRC. Deng’s main 
goals were normalization with the United States and the peaceful reunification of Taiwan. 
President Nixon’s talks with Mao and Deng’s desire for normalization talks led to the 
establishment of the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in 1979.17 With the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the United States, Deng announced a new “peaceful 
reunification” approach to Taiwan. In accordance with prior agreements, the United 
States acknowledged the PRC position that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of that 
China. This United States acknowledgement ended the artificial legitimacy the ROC 
maintained in the international arena.18 
Although the artificial legitimacy of the ROC ended, the relationship between the 
Unites States and the ROC became ambiguous on purpose with the passing of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. The TRA stated that the United States terminated all 
governmental relations with the ROC in order to maintain peace and stability in the 
Western Pacific.19 Although the United States wanted to maintain its new ties with the 
PRC, the United States also did not want Taiwan to be swept up by China without its 
consent. Therefore, the TRA established a U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward 
                                                 
15 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 378-379. 
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Taiwan, a policy enforced for the past twenty-four years.20  To support its new policy, the 
TRA states that the reunification of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means, but 
it also authorized U.S. arm sales to Taiwan in an effort to defend against possible PRC 
aggression. The TRA allows the US the opportunity to defend Taiwan in the event of 
PRC aggression, but also allows the US to use diplomatic means against the PRC to stop 
the use of force.21 This policy is strongly opposed by the PRC. In an effort to show its 
disapproval, the PRC on numerous occasions protested to Washington.22 In 1982, the 
United States agreed to limit arms sales to Taiwan to maintain strategic cooperation with 
the PRC against the Soviet Union. In response, President Reagan sent a letter establishing 
six assurances to the ROC that Washington would: 
1)  Not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 
2)  Not agree to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to 
Taiwan; 
3)  Not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; 
4)  Not agree to revise the TRA; 
5)  Not alter its longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over 
Taiwan; and 
6)  Not attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the 
PRC.23 
 
These assurances both apprised the PRC where the United States stood on the 
Taiwan issue and reassured the ROC that the United States would not allow Beijing to 
take advantage of them.  
PRC-ROC relations remained relatively calm until Lee Teng-hui, the successor to 
Chiang, visited his alma mater, Cornell University. During his visit, Lee made it a point 
to vocally profess the existence of a Republic of China on Taiwan.24 The media attention 
Lee’s visit received gave the PRC the impression the United States was stepping away 
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from the “one China” policy and helping Taiwan move towards independence. Lee 
further infuriated the PRC by dispatching Taiwanese warships to Singapore as part of a 
friendly port visit. Also, Germany’s untimely announcement of eased restrictions on arms 
sales for Taiwan forced the PRC to act. The PRC, infuriated with continued outside 
interference, warned foreign leaders not to interfere with China’s reunification.25 In 
Beijing’s mind, these events forced it to remind Taiwan of the “one China” policy. 
In 1995-1996, to show its resolve about Taiwan being part of China, the PRC 
announced it would conduct a series of military exercises off Taiwan’s coast. These 
exercises were designed to coincide with the Taiwanese presidential election and warn 
the people and government of Taiwan to limit their calls for independence. The first 
exercise took place in July 1995 with the launching of six PLA missiles towards Taiwan. 
The second exercise took place in March 1996. As part of the exercise, the PLA used the 
Second Artillery Corps, the strategic missile force, to launch M-9 short-range ballistic 
missiles near Taiwan for seventeen days.26 In response to the SRBM launches, the United 
States directed two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait. While the Battle 
Groups steamed toward Taiwan, the PLA conducted an air and sea portion of the military 
exercise. The PLA deployed combat aircraft and submarines in a limited joint venture to 
each end of the Taiwan Strait. One of the most significant elements of the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis was the PLAN’s ability to deploy submarines designated to blockade 
the Strait.27 A naval blockade is seen as the most likely scenario of a Chinese effort to 
unify Taiwan by force.28 The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis ended with the PLA concluding 
its military exercise, but it also received foresight as to how the United States might react 
to future PRC aggression toward Taiwan and ideas on how to counter the U.S. threat. 
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The ambiguous relationship between the US-PRC-ROC continued in the late 
1990s. In 1998, President Bill Clinton traveled to the PRC for a state visit and announced 
his “three-no’s” policy. President Clinton stated: 
We don’t support independence for Taiwan; or two Chinas; or one 
Taiwan, one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a 
member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.29 
President Clinton’s announcement of the “three-no’s” policy was extremely 
controversial and seen as appeasement to the PRC for few gains and a withdrawal of 
support for the ROC. To counter these claims, President Clinton supported a bipartisan 
bill passed by Congress in 1999 to support the ROC. The Taiwan Security Enhancement 
Act was initiated due to the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force in the 
reunification of Taiwan and due to the PLA’s modernization program; the defense of a 
democratic Taiwan by its own people was seen in jeopardy. The TSEA allowed the U.S. 
Secretaries of State and Defense to analyze ROC defenses and implement appropriate 
military sales.30 The end result was the United States increasing sales of advanced 
military aircraft and warships to Taiwan. With the increased sales of advanced military 
weaponry to the ROC, the PRC has protested to Washington warning about the ill effects 
to Sino-U.S. relations of increased arm sales. At the same time, the PRC has understood 
the capability of hi-tech U.S. weaponry due to its intense studies of the Persian Gulf War 
and the campaign in Kosovo. With the possibility of facing such equipment off its coast, 
the PLA has focused its modernization efforts on defeating the capabilities of a more 
technologically superior enemy. 
President George W. Bush has maintained the policy of strategic ambiguity with 
Taiwan and continues to support the “one China” policy. However, in the early days of 
his presidency, President Bush came under severe criticism for his comments on ABC’s 
Good Morning America. When asked by reporter Charles Gibson if the United States was 
obligated to defend Taiwan if China attacked, President Bush responded affirmatively 
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and added “the Chinese must understand that” he would use whatever it took to help 
Taiwan.31 Many critics felt that this was a divergence from the “one China” policy, but 
White House officials quickly stated President Bush’s statement was no different from 
past U.S. policies. In a visit to Washington in December 2003, the PRC’s Premier, Wen 
Jiabao, was reassured by President Bush that a declaration of independence from Taiwan 
would not be supported by the United States unless it was in agreement with China’s 
wishes. However, President Bush also made it clear that a peaceful solution to 
reunification must be achieved between China and Taiwan. 
C.  RELEVANCE OF PLA MODERNIZATION 
In 1985, the PRC began a dedicated process of PLA modernization with the intent 
of accomplishing numerous new political and strategic goals for the PRC. First, and 
foremost, the PRC wants to be prepared for military action against its primary security 
threat, Taiwan. With a modernized PLA and reunification with Taiwan, the PRC will be 
one step closer to reaching its long-term strategic goal: regional hegemony.32 Currently, 
PLA forces are not equipped to accomplish either of these goals, but within the next 
twenty years the PLA may become a peer competitor to the United States in the Asian-
Pacific Region and greatly affect the future of Taiwan. 
According to the PRC’s 2002 national defense white paper, Beijing opposes all 
kinds of hegonisms, combats terrorism in all forms and manifestations, and will strive to 
create an environment dedicated to peace, stability and security.33 While Beijing states 
publicly that peace and stability are its goals, the modernization of its military shows the 
opposite. Its modernization program is directly aimed towards the use of hi-tech 
weaponry against its enemies, particularly Taiwan.34 As its claims to various territories in 
the Asian-Pacific Region intensify, the PRC justifies PLA modernization as necessary to 
defend against foreign aggression, to resist domestic enemies, and to secure its borders. 
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The PRC is creating highly mobile, specialized units to secure its borders and ensure the 
swift resolution to any crisis it may face.  
The PLA seeks one of the U.S. greatest military assets: the ability to project 
power. The PLA Navy (PLAN) seeks to develop better capabilities for various reasons.35 
First, the PRC currently has an increasing dependence on foreign oil imports from the 
Middle East. The PRC recognizes the U.S. Navy currently keeps the sea lanes open and 
allows foreign oil to reach China. The PRC does not feel secure about the U.S. control 
over this key facet of their economy and well-being. Second, the PRC wants to exert 
greater influence over the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and the East China Sea. By 
exerting greater influence, the PRC believes it would be able to ensure greater security on 
the mainland by maintaining control of the territories along its borders. By achieving the 
ability to project power, the PRC will be one step closer to becoming a regional 
hegemon.  
Further evidence that PLA modernization affects Asian-Pacific security is in the 
PRC’s “new concept of security.” This new security concept was officially submitted in a 
1998 PRC Defense White Paper. The new concept postulates peaceful coexistence and 
that no other nation should interfere with the internal affairs of another nation.36 This new 
concept was specifically directed at the United States for the increased military sales to 
Taiwan, the U.S. alliances in Asia, and the continued military presence in the region. 
Although, the new concept states that nations should not resort to military threats or 
aggression, the PRC still refuses to withdraw its threats of force against Taiwan if it 
declares independence because Beijing considers Taiwan sovereignty an internal matter. 
In the minds of PRC leaders, PLA modernization is also necessary to maintain security 
against domestic threats.37 The PRC’s stance for continued military modernization, a 
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reluctance to withdraw threats of force against Taiwan and a desire to project its power 
throughout Asia will have a dramatic effect over the region in the coming years. 
D.  SUMMARY 
The PRC is preparing for its future by modernizing its military as a means to 
reunify with Taiwan. The PRC understands that Taiwan wants its independence, but if it 
declares independence without international support the US may not become involved in 
its defense. However, the PRC’s own defense papers discuss the need to modernize its 
military to defend against security threats and interference from foreign nations with its 
internal business. If these mandates are deemed violated, the PRC feels it has the right to 
use its military in its own defense against any aggressor. In the next twenty years, the 
PRC will have a modernized military force capable of competing with the US and any 
defenses on Taiwan. Once achieving its goal of a modernized military, the PRC will then 
be one step closer to achieving its grand strategy of regional hegemony and forcing 








































III.  PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
For most of its existence, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has been largely ignored by the 
PLA leadership. Even though the Navy is part of the PLA, the infantry forces have 
traditionally received the bulk of the defense budget. China’s leaders believed the PLA 
infantry was most important to the defense of the PRC. This neglect forced the PLAN to 
wither and become an obsolete fighting force. Since the 1980s, the PRC has changed its 
views of the PLAN and now is taking action to make the PLAN a modern navy.  
The PRC understands that an advanced maritime capability will allow it to 
confront its enemies on the high seas, provide a forward maritime defense presence for 
the mainland, rapidly deploy its forces in the Western Pacific and eventually extend the 
PRC past its land borders into the Pacific Ocean.38 Currently, the PLAN does not have 
the naval assets either to defend its borders or deploy a blue ocean force. Most ships in 
the PLAN are used only for coastal defense and cannot steam far from their homeports 
due to poor maintenance and a lack of operational training. The PRC foresees an 
advanced maritime capability as affecting its standing throughout the world and is 
preparing for the future. To gain this capability, the PRC has implemented intensive 
modernization programs for the PLAN. These programs have focused on eliminating 
older ships, building a new amphibious fleet and acquiring advanced foreign warships 
and submarines to augment the fleet past its obsolescence.39 As the PLAN modernizes, 
its new advanced fleet will directly affect the future of Taiwan and also the Western 
Pacific by allowing the PLAN to conduct long-term naval operations in hopes of 
achieving regional hegemony. As the PLAN modernizes and begins to project its power, 
the PLAN will be a key factor in forcing Taiwan to reunify. This chapter discusses the 
progress of PLAN modernization and the role the PLAN will play in the PRC’s grand 
strategy.   
                                                 
38 Swaine and Tellis, p. 162. 
39 US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report on the Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: July 2003), pp. 24-27. 




B.  WARSHIP MODERNIZATION 
1. Surface Combatants 
The PLAN is one of the largest navies in the world. Despite this quantitative 
advantage, the PLAN currently does not pose a significant threat to ROC forces due to its 
technological inferiority.40 In the past, the PLAN’s inability to develop indigenous 
technology or effectively to reverse engineer foreign technology created a wide 
qualitative gap between the PLAN and the ROC Navy. This was due to the PRC’s not 
having the economic resources needed to keep up with the advanced warships the ROC 
was receiving from the Unites States and because the PLAN received little emphasis and 
therefore budget allocations because of its limited role in PRC defense strategy. 
The PLAN surface fleet currently consists of 62 surface combatants, 39 mine 
warfare ships, 368 coastal patrol craft and four replenishment-at-sea oilers.41 The poor 
state of the PLAN surface fleet does not allow its surface combatants to venture far from 
their homeports and allow the PLAN to secure China’s coasts much past its littoral 
waters. However, the PRC has implemented new programs to turn the PLAN surface 
fleet around with advanced surface and anti-submarine capabilities. Also, with the United 
States restricting sales of its most advanced warships to Taiwan, the PRC is beginning to 
close the qualitative gap. Due to renewed interaction with Russia, the PRC has received 
advanced warships capable of propelling the PLAN into a blue-water navy. Also, the 
PLAN has focused on retrofitting its few relatively well-maintained surface combatants 
in the fleet with advanced radars and weapon systems capable of effectively engaging 
U.S. and ROC warships.  
The weakest link of the PLAN’s surface fleet in the Taiwan Strait is the Jianghu- 
class frigates. The Jianghu was designed to be used much like the U.S. Oliver Hazard 
Perry-class frigates, deploying a large number of inexpensive ships designed for shallow-
water operations and operating with few offensive capabilities. The Jianghu has proven 
to be an outdated design and no longer is applicable in today’s world of combat. With the 
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Jianghu weak in all warfare areas, its sole purpose is to only conduct surveillance off the 
coast of Taiwan. However, the PLAN has retrofitted the Jianghu to carry the C-802 anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCM), which has a range of seventy nautical miles and able to 
travel at Mach 0.9.42 The PLAN intends for the Jianghu to protect the more advanced 
surface combatants by taking the first enemy missiles attacks. Even with the C-802 
capability, the poor radar system on the Jianghu will not be able to detect the ROC ships 
attacking before they are attacked themselves. In an effort to rebuild its frigate fleet, the 
PLAN is developing an indigenous model designated the Type-054 Stealth Frigate. The 
Stealth Frigate will eventually replace the aging Jianghu and patrol the Taiwan Strait in 
an effort to gather better surveillance of Taiwan. The current Type-054 design has 
improved radar and weapon systems and a hull less likely to give off a strong radar 
signature. Another reason behind the Type-054’s production is Taiwan’s French-built 
Lafayette frigate, which has many of the same capabilities.43 The development of the 
Type-054 shows the PLAN will no longer allow ROC forces to receive advanced weapon 
systems without advancing their own current forces. 
Unlike the poor capabilities of the Jianghu, the Luhai-class destroyer is one of the 
great strides the PLAN has made to build indigenous warships with better war-fighting 
capabilities. Based on reverse engineering of the Soviet designed Luda-class destroyer, 
the Luhai destroyers are an advance in every way over the earlier Luda. The Luhai carries 
the C-802 ASCM, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and has a less radar-reflective hull, but 
it still lacks exceptional anti-submarine warfare (ASW), electronic warfare (EW) and 
over-the-horizon (OTH) strike capabilities.44 The Luhai will be deployed at the forward 
edge of the battlefield, much like the Jianghu, but with its capabilities it will be a more 
effective weapon against U.S. and ROC forces. Fortunately for ROC forces, the Luhai 
can easily be prosecuted by air assets or shore emplacements. 
After the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PLAN saw the need for a surface 
combatant to effectively attack U.S. carriers and warships after two U.S. carrier battle 
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groups began patrolling off the coast of Taiwan. One of the PLAN’s major foreign 
acquisitions towards this need is the Russian Sovremenny-class guided missiles destroyer 
(DDG). The Sovremenny was originally designed during the Cold War for the specific 
purpose of escorting Soviet carriers and destroying American ones.45 When Russia 
decided to sell its destroyer fleet, the PLAN wanted the Sovremenny for its patrols of the 
Taiwan Strait. These destroyers are equipped with SS-N-2/Sunburn ASCMs and the SA-
N-7 SAM systems, both designed for long-range attacks on enemy surface combatants 
and helicopters. The Sunburn has a range of 120 nautical miles (nm), travels at Mach 2.5 
and stays low to the surface of the water to ensure ROC and U.S. weapon systems cannot 
defend against it. In 2001, the PLAN successfully launched a Sunburn and requisitioned 
more of these missiles from Russia because of their excellent performance.46 The 
Sovremmeny destroyers are also equipped with the AK-630M 30-mm Gatling gun, 
comparable to the U.S. Navy’s close-in-weapon system (CIWS), and the 130-mm dual-
purpose gun.47 Both weapons systems are designed to defeat any attacks from ROC and 
U.S. forces while allowing the offensive systems of the destroyer to conduct a successful 
counterattack. The Sovremmeny proved its combat potential so well that the PLAN has 
reportedly ordered two more destroyers be added to its fleet. Once these destroyers are 
purchased they will most likely be stationed in the East Sea Fleet, responsible for the 
Taiwan Strait. The purchase of the two Sovremenny destroyers greatly improved the 
PLAN’s anti-ship capability and forces U.S. naval planners to revise their actions in the 
Taiwan Strait. 
Due to the advancement of airpower as the primary weapon used in combat, a 
PLAN surface combatant without proper air defense capabilities is useless. Equipped 
with F-16 Falcons the ROC Air Force has air power superiority over the Taiwan Strait. 
The ROC Air Force routinely trains to sink PLAN warships due to the lack of adequate 
anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities on PLAN warships. However, the PLAN recognizes 
this weakness and has developed a destroyer designed for AAW. Based on the U.S. 
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AEGIS Combat System, the PLAN recently launched the No. 170-class destroyer with 
characteristics similar to the ACS. The No. 170’s hull is designed to be less radar- 
reflective, consists of a Russian OTH targeting system and implements a vertically 
launched missile system firing both indigenous and Russian anti-air missiles (AAM). The 
PLAN not only sees the deployment of the No. 170-class as a great accomplishment for 
the PLAN research and development (R&D) department, Naval Equipment and Training 
Research Department (NETRD), but with the United States still not providing the ROC 
Navy with ACS capable ships, it sees itself as quickly closing the qualitative gap with 
Taiwan.48 The No. 170 is yet to be tested in field conditions, but if the exercise goes as 
well as the tests, the No. 170 will be an effective deterrent against ROC aircraft. The PRC 
is calling the No. 170 destroyer “China’s Magic Shield” and has grand plans for its use 
against Taiwan.49  
The East Sea Fleet, headquartered at Ningbo, has designated the Taiwan Strait 
part of its AOR and will most likely be the PLAN headquarters for any attack on 
Taiwan.50 The East Sea Fleet is devising plans to conduct naval operations against the 
ROC, but also understands numerous capabilities are lacking for successful operations. 
The PLAN needs two items to effectively conduct long-term naval operations against 
Taiwan and to project naval power in the Western Pacific. First, the PLAN does not have 
the ability to refuel with its surface combatants at sea (RAS). RAS is important to PLAN 
naval operations because it will allow continuous and efficient steaming from the East 
Sea Fleet homeport to Taiwan and back. The PLAN does have four RAS oilers, but the 
majority of PLAN ships do not regularly train to RAS. The inability of the PLAN to 
conduct RAS efficiently is a detriment to long-term blockade in the Taiwan Strait and 
continuous naval operations off the Taiwan coast. However, the PLAN is making strides 
to add RAS to its training doctrine and practiced on a regular basis. Also, the PLAN is 
allocating more money to building more oilers for the fleet. Although important, RAS 
will not be adequate for some time in the PLAN. 
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The second PLAN need is to project its naval power is an aircraft carrier. The 
PRC has seen the United States respond numerous times to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait 
with carrier battle groups. The PRC has seen an aircraft carrier as an effective combat 
tool not only off of its coast, but in the analysis of combat in Arabian Gulf and Kosovo. 
Through analyzing its potential, the PRC has had numerous debates over whether to build 
PLAN aircraft carriers. The deployment of a PLAN aircraft carrier has powerful 
persuasive potential against Taiwan, but current problems with the PLAN do not make it 
a viable option. According to media reports, the PRC purchased three decommissioned 
aircraft carriers from Russia, Ukraine and Australia after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. 
Due to poor funding and a lack of operational training, one carrier was scrapped, another 
turned into a casino and the last one will eventually be turned into a theme park.51 Even 
though the PLAN trained some of its senior officers to command a carrier at sea, the PRC 
has no intention to build or purchase a deployable carrier in the next few years. If the 
PRC does begin a dedicated process of building a carrier without proper funds, Taiwan 
will be able to sleep better because a large amount of the PRC’s limited resources will 
evaporate. However, if Beijing’s debates cease and the economic success of China allows 
it to build a carrier, the ROC will be in significant trouble due to the PRC new ability to 
project its power on Taiwan.   
2. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
The use of submarines in the Taiwan Strait is a key element in any forceful 
reunification scenario. The PRC knows the proper use of submarines will be the main 
obstacle to surface combatants safely patrolling the Taiwan Strait. With anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) extremely hard to conduct due to the terrain and the lack of practice by 
the ROC, the PLAN is training its submarines to take advantage of the situation in the 
Taiwan Strait. As their efficiency grows, the PLAN hopes to be able to control not only 
the surface, but also the subsurface waters around Taiwan.52 Based on this importance, 
the PRC is providing significant resources to the PLAN not only to build, but purchase 
foreign diesel and nuclear submarines. Numerous acquisitions from Russia have proven 
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beneficial, but the Russian Kilo submarines with ASCM capability have significantly 
augmented the PLAN inventory of submarines. Also, the NETRD has made significant 
strides in developing quieter hulls using indigenous technology with Russian help. A 
PLAN submarine patrolling the Taiwan Strait can wreck havoc on any ROC or U.S. 
surface combatant trying to defend the coast. The increased use of PLAN submarines will 
substantially affect the ROC’s ability to secure its coast from invasion. It will also force 
U.S. planners to use aircraft carriers differently than in the past. 
The majority of the PLAN’s 69 submarines are the poorly maintained and hardly 
deployed Soviet Romeo-class diesel (SS) submarines. These submarines are horrible 
ASW due to poorly trained crews and a significant lack of logistics forcing engineering 
problems to go unchecked.53 Unless deployed in large numbers, the Romeo’s provide no 
value to the PLAN in Taiwan Strait operations due to their poor operability. As part of 
the PLAN modernization program, the NETRD has developed two submarines using 
reverse engineering from the Romeo. Both submarines are a slight advancement over the 
older Romeo, but they are still not as quiet as the Russian Kilo. The Ming-class submarine 
is an upgrade over the older Romeo submarine, but it is too obsolete for modern undersea 
combat. The Ming, like the Romeo, can be deployed in large numbers to operate in the 
shallow waters off the coast of Taiwan, but cannot do much more due to its obsolete 
systems. The Song-class improves on the Ming design in every way. The Song has a 
better sonar system, and a better navigational system and is not plagued by the logistical 
problems like its predecessor. Therefore, the Song has the ability to be underway more 
and receives better training opportunities from the PLAN. The Song was designed with a 
skewed propeller for quieter running and an offensive missile capability specifically 
designed to attack surface combatants while still submerged. The Song carries the YJ-82 
ASCM, a submarine launched cruise missile.54 While not the quietest submarines in the 
world, the ability for the PLAN to operate numerous submarines off Taiwan and the ROC 
inefficiency in ASW will help the PLAN deny the waters around Taiwan to its enemies. 
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The purchase of four Kilo-class submarines from Russia helps propel the PLAN 
submarine fleet toward becoming a modern fleet. Not only are the Kilo submarines 
extremely quiet and effective ASW platforms, but Russia is selling the submarines cheap 
together with the training and logistics necessary to deploy these submarines for long 
periods of time. According to ONI, the Kilo is rated as quiet as an improved U.S. Los 
Angeles-class nuclear (SSN) submarine and gives the PLAN a significant advantage over 
the ROC.55 The acquisition of the Kilos gave the PLAN numerous submarine capabilities 
it previously lacked. The Kilo carries wake-homing and wire guided torpedoes, better 
acoustic sensors for submarine detection, reinforced hulls and an advanced engineering 
system that allows longer submersion before having to recharge their batteries.56 With a 
quieter design, better offensive weapons and an extremely effective sonar system, the 
Kilo will prove an effective deterrent to ROC surface combatants that are not sufficient in 
ASW.  
Mines are effective weapons designed to control chokepoints and the perfect 
offensive weapon to aid in the blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Mine warfare (MIW) is 
extremely easy to implement and extremely difficult to counter, especially with the 
ROC’s limited experience in MIW. The ROC Navy does not have a dedicated group of 
MIW ships able to efficiently counter a mine threat and has no plans to designate one. 
The PLAN has 39 mine warfare ships, but they are of questionable operational 
readiness.57 However, the PLAN has implemented doctrine to conduct MIW from all it 
platforms, especially submarines. According to the 2003 U.S. Congress report on the 
PRC’s military, the PLAN has an excellent supply of mines capable of seriously deterring 
surface combatants. The NETRD has either developed mines, or purchased foreign ones, 
of varying technologies designed to thwart commercial shipping entering into Taiwan, as 
well as warships. The PLAN mines available are bottom and moored influenced, mobile, 
remote-controlled, and propelled-warhead mines, used especially in the deep water 
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outside the Taiwan Strait.58 As quiet PLAN submarines train in laying mine fields at each 
end of the Taiwan Strait, the ROC needs to recognize the effectiveness of this threat or a 
significant warfare area will give another advantage to the PRC.   
The first PRC attempt at an indigenous nuclear fast attack submarine (SSN) was 
the Han-class. The PLAN has five Han SSNs, but each is in horrible operational 
condition. Due to poor PLAN maintenance, the Hans are located in the North Fleet area 
and spend the majority of time in port. The PLAN desires a quiet SSN to patrol the 
Taiwan Strait for surveillance purposes, but with its loud noise signature easily detectable 
by ROC and US forces, the use of a Han in the Taiwan Strait is highly unlikely. 
However, the PLAN is expected to correct the problems of the Han by launching the first 
boat in the Type-093 class around 2005. The Type-093 is expected to be based on Russian 
hull technology and will carry land attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCM), wire guided and wake-homing torpedoes and mines.59 The advanced 
engineering system is likely to be as quiet as the Kilo submarine. Once the Type-093 class 
is launched, it will replace the Han submarines. The PLAN will then deploy the new SSN 
in the East Sea Fleet for continued patrols through the Taiwan Strait. The full number of 
Type-093 submarines entering PLAN service is expected to be four by 2010.60 As the 
new SSN replaces the older one, the PLAN will overpower any ROC ASW prosecution 
in the Taiwan Strait. 
Along with SSN advancements, the PLAN plans to overhaul its strategic 
submarine fleet. The PLAN currently has one nuclear, ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN), the Xia. The Xia was overhauled in the late 1990s for extended service around 
Taiwan, but still remains largely inoperable. The PLAN desires to develop mobile 
strategic deterrence with a new SSBN fleet. For this purpose, the PLAN is developing is 
the Type-094. The PLAN intends to launch the Type-094 SSBN with Russian assistance 
and maintenance. The Type-094 will reportedly have a quieter engineering system and be 
able to travel globally from its homeport, unlike the Xia. For its strategic deterrence, the 
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Type-094 is scheduled to carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 
which carries a multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) still in development.61 The 
JL-2 is expected to have a range of roughly seven thousand miles and several 
independent-targeted nuclear warheads. With a quieter SSBN sailing through the Pacific 
Ocean, the ROC and the United States will need to provide more assets dedicated to 
defend Taiwan and prosecute the SSBN.  
C.  AMPHIBIOUS FORCES 
 The PLAN amphibious fleet is less than stellar. An amphibious assault on Taiwan 
is seen as the riskiest option the PRC can take and deemed highly unlikely. The current 
fleet of 56 amphibious ships could not move more than a division (12,000) of PLA 
infantry soldiers and 400 armored vehicles, hardly enough to ensure a successful invasion 
of Taiwan.62 However, the PLAN recognizes its weakness and has made considerable 
efforts to make an amphibious assault successful. Also, the PLAN has put forth 
considerable resources to build up its Marine Corps, while manpower throughout the 
PLA decreases.  
 In an effort to modernize its amphibious fleet, the PLAN intends to build enough 
landing craft to support the transportation of numerous PLA infantry divisions. The goal 
is to have enough landing craft transporting more than enough infantry divisions, both 
front line and reserve, to assault Taiwan. As noted before, the current PLAN landing craft 
could not support the troops needed to invade Taiwan. A ratio of five PLA soldiers for 
every ROC soldier, over one million PLA troops, is needed to conduct a successful 
invasion.63 The current amphibious fleet is only adequate to secure one the offshore 
islands claimed by Taiwan. The PLAN is currently producing the Yudeng and Yuhai 
landing ships (LSM) in an effort to build up the fleet, but their numbers will not be 
adequate for quite some time. The ROC understands that the rough terrain along the coast 
and the lack of adequate PLAN amphibious ships is a great advantage against an 
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amphibious assault, but they cannot rely on the PLAN’s lack of capabilities as its own 
defense. 
 The main amphibious force of the PLAN is its Marine Corps. The Marine Corps 
is designed much like the U.S. Marines and acts as a rapid reaction force dispatched to 
quell hotspots, insert small units into enemy-occupied areas and secure airfields and 
landing zones in support of the arriving larger PLA divisions. The PLAN considers the 
Marine Corps its elite unit and outfits it with only the best equipment and personnel.64 
The Marines are trained to operate independently only for a short time and can handle 
light armored forces on their own. The PLAN Marines will most likely lead the 
amphibious invasion of Taiwan by securing ROC naval facilities and off-shore gun 
emplacements. However, if a large armored force or enemy close-air support (CAS) 
begins intensive attacks as it crosses the Strait or is left without air cover as it moves 
inland, it will not last long.  
The PLAN followed the example of U.S. military forces and began intense joint 
operations among their services. Recent amphibious exercises were designed to simulate 
an assault on a beachhead. These exercises included PLAN Marines working closely with 
PLA regular infantry to assault beachheads. In a Taiwan scenario, the Marines would 
land on a simulated contested beach and secure ROC gun emplacements and to allow 
heavier armored units to move forward.65 With the rest of the PLA regular infantry 
getting smaller, the PLAN Marine Corps continues to get larger and is striving to become 
the PRC’s most efficient fighting force. ROC forces need plans to contend with PLAN 
Marines landing on their beaches. If not and ROC forces allow PLAN Marines to 
advance past the contested ROC beachhead, it will cause serious problems for Taiwan’s 
effort to control the flow of PLA infantry coming ashore. 
D.  PLAN AVIATION 
Much like the rest of the PLA, the PLANAF has operated with obsolete 
equipment for most of its existence. The PLANAF began an earnest effort to weed out 
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aircraft that are either poorly maintained or logistically cannot be sustained. Their 
inventory has decreased from 800 aircraft to roughly 485.66 The PLANAF consists of 
helicopters and jet aircraft located on surface combatants and shore facilities, 
respectively. Most of the jet aircraft in the PLANAF arsenal are older PLAAF models, 
consisting of fighters, bombers and strike aircraft. The PLANAF has not yet been issued 
any of the new Russian acquisitions, the Su-27 Flankers or Su-30 MKK, but it continues 
to request them. Much like the PLAAF, the PLANAF suffers from a lack of flight time 
and an inability to conduct long-range flights. The PLAN intends to modernize the 
PLANAF to overcome its weaknesses and make it a significant arm of its fighting force.  
The Russian aircraft bought by the PRC have aided the PLANAF significantly. 
The PLANAF recently acquired eight Russian KA-28 destroyer-based ASW helicopters, 
with the intention of implementing them into their surface fleet.67 The PLAN analyzed 
U.S. Navy operations and recognized that the combination of a surface combatant with a 
helicopter can make an extremely effective team. The PLAN wants its ship-based 
helicopters to be efficient in all types of warfare. The KA-28 is not only designed for 
ASW, but has an advanced C4ISR system. C4ISR provides the PLAN with an OTH 
capability which allows it to strike both land and sea targets. Another advantage of the 
advanced helicopter, the KA-28 can work jointly with a surface combatant in prosecution 
of an enemy submarine. The surface combatant can configure the prosecution far away 
from any danger, while the helicopter engages the submarine from above. The PLAN 
sees the full implementation of ship-based helicopters as integral to the future outlook for 
maritime combat.  
The PLANAF has also begun intense operations with the PLAAF. Without an 
aircraft carrier, the PLANAF needs viable shore-based facilities close enough to Taiwan 
to launch strikes against ROC ships, shore emplacements and U.S. forces intervening in 
the area. The large number of PLAAF airfields in the East Sea Fleet area helps the 
PLANAF in this effort. Besides the use of shore-based facilities, both air services are 
striving to work jointly together on many levels. First, both air services are training on in-
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flight refueling and flying missions over the water. Due to the distance between shore-
based facilities and Taiwan, the PLA combat aircraft cannot sustain flights long enough 
to strike effectively into the heart of Taiwan and return to their home base without 
refueling in-flight. Also, the hesitance of PRC combat aircraft to travel over water 
severely limits the number of air-strikes or air cover both services can provide to the PLA 
troops traveling to or on Taiwan. Both air services lack efficient in-flight refueling skills, 
but they have worked jointly on several occasions to become more proficient.68 Several 
attempts between both air services have been made to practice in-flight refueling 
together, although some were successful, they were not enough to give the majority of 
pilots any proficiency. Only time will show if this goal may be realized.  
The second joint cooperation between the PLAAF and the PLANAF is in the area 
of air control. Both air services are working together to gain confidence in one another in 
order to gain air superiority over ROC forces. While few inter-service flights have yet 
been conducted, both air services understand the need for better cooperation. The more 
trained PRC pilots conducting exercises in denying the ROC the air, the less practice they 
would need later. Also, as the PRC tries to acquire an AWACs platform, prior training is 
necessary its implement its full potential. A large number of joint air missions needs to be 
conducted before either air service engages in air-to-air combat, but the PLANAF sees its 
future in that direction.  
E.  PLAN’S ROLE IN PRC GRAND STRATEGY 
The PRC’s ultimate goal is becoming a regional hegemon. The PRC’s 
dependence on foreign nations to provide it with critical national resources, particularly 
crude oil from the Middle East, and their interference with numerous PRC domestic 
issues are the main reasons for this quest of hegemony. The PRC feels that as its role in 
the international arena grows and dependence on foreign nation decreases, then a grand 
sense of national strength will emerge.69 The PLAN will eventually force this to happen 
by pushing the boundaries of the PRC far beyond where they currently stand and 
becoming the predominant political and military power in the region. In 1991, Vice 
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Admiral Cheng Mingshang, vice commander-in-chief of the navy, vocalized his views on 
the future of the PLAN and how it supports the PRC’s grand strategy: 
The navy is the tool of the big powers’ foreign policy. Compared with the 
army and air force, which cannot go beyond the national boundaries, an 
international navy can project its presence far away from home. It can 
appear in the sea close to the coastlines of potential opponents. While this 
demonstration of power constitutes a high level of deterrence, it does not 
provide any formal excuse for the target countries to protest. Such a 
function of projecting power has made the navy a most active strategic 
force in peace time, a pillar for foreign policy initiatives and an 
embodiment of a country’s will and power.70 
 
Once the PLAN modernization is fully implemented, it will help the PRC achieve its goal 
of regional hegemony and force the settlement of numerous territorial disputes in the 
Western Pacific.  
 Ideally, the PRC hopes the PLAN will play that important role in its grand 
strategy. However, the current rate of PLAN modernization is only designed to secure the 
PRC’s maritime borders against security threats. With Taiwan the primary security 
concern, the PLAN is focusing its modernization on forcing Taiwan to reunify and secure 
the islands around the mainland.  
As the PLAN modernizes towards its current goal, it is supporting an active 
defense against off-shore enemies, namely Taiwan.71 The PLAN created its current 
defense strategy based on former PLAN head, General Liu Huaqing. He expressed his 
concerns over the PRC’s inability to defend against its enemy at sea. By using the 
traditional Maoist ideal of “active defense,” General Liu called for decisive action by the 
PLAN. He called for the PLAN to seek out and attack the enemy on the battleground it 
chooses and not the other way around. U.S. Navy analyst Bernard Cole feels that active 
defense appeals to the nature of PLAN strategists. Cole suggests that if the PLAN were to 
engage in maritime combat today, then active defense will best apply to it. The PLAN 
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would need to rely on mobility, naval commanders with initiative, and effective surprise 
attacks.72 The current PLAN training doctrine is practicing just these qualities.  
The PRC is implementing active defense by focusing on five maritime interests 
directly related to securing its borders. The focus of these five items will allow the PRC 
to control not only its maritime borders, but the territories around them, as well. The five 
items are: 
1)  ocean islands 
2)  sea-space jurisdiction 
3)  marine resources  
4)  maritime strategic advantage 
5)  strategic sea lanes73 
  
Each of these items is currently a challenge for the PLAN. However, the PLAN 
sees its future flourishing as it modernizes and prepares for future naval operations.   
The role of the PLAN in the future of PRC’s grand strategy is guaranteed, and the 
PLAN will have a significant role. Although, with the progress of modernization steady 
but slow, the PLAN is currently focusing on the security needs of the PRC rather than its 
political goals of power projection throughout Asia. Within twenty years, the PLAN will 
have a modern force that may be able to fulfill the political aspirations of Beijing. 
F.  SUMMARY 
 The PLAN recognizes that it has weaknesses that will not allow it to take 
successful aggressive action against Taiwan. Most problems with the PLAN are with its 
obsolete fleet of surface and amphibious ships, poor maintenance with its maritime 
aircraft and the lack of appropriate training time. However, the PLAN leadership 
understands the operational changes needed to make the PLAN into a first-class blue 
water navy. The help received from Russia has allowed the PLAN to acquire advanced 
destroyers capable of sinking aircraft carriers, helicopters capable of prosecuting 
submarines and conducting OTH strikes and submarines quiet enough to evade enemy 
ASW prosecution. Along with the training of PLAN Marine Corps for amphibious 
assaults, Taiwan needs to significantly worry about the PLAN modernization. If Taiwan 
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chooses independence, the PLAN doctrine of “active defense” will force Taiwan, and 
possibly U.S. forces, to fight on the PLAN’s terms. As the PLAN modernizes itself into a 













IV.  PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 Due to revolutions in combat, air power now plays a significant role in successful 
military operations. Through intense study of numerous U.S. military campaigns, the 
PRC understands that it needs an air force capable of conducting sustained combat 
operations if it were to defeat the United States or the ROC in combat. However, the PLA 
Air Force (PLAAF) has operated with obsolete aircraft since the departure of Soviet 
assistance in the late 1950s. Inferior training doctrine compounds the PLAAF’s 
inferiority by allowing too few flight hours and not enough real world flight training. 
Throughout most of its history, the PLAAF has been subordinate to the PLA’s regular 
infantry and led by a general officer who was an infantry soldier and not a pilot. Due to 
the PRC’s preoccupation with ground combat, the PLAAF suffered from a lack of budget 
allocations and was restricted to operating only within the boundaries of a ground 
campaign. While the PRC was until recently preoccupied with outdated concepts of war 
and obsolete equipment, the ROC received advanced weapon systems, particularly 
combat aircraft, trained in defeating the PRC with newer combat tactics, and built up 
their defenses, with U.S. help, against possible PRC aggression. These constraints meant 
that the PLAAF languished and became an ineffective force against Taiwan. 
 In 1991, the revelation of a new way to fight a war dawned upon the PRC 
leadership during the Persian Gulf War. The world witnessed advanced airpower inflict 
massive damage on a large force that was primarily concerned with ground combat. After 
forty years of preparing to trade space for time as the only way for the PLA to win wars, 
the PRC now believes advanced air power could negate their theory.74 After intense 
study of the Persian Gulf War, the PLAAF began a dedicated effort to realize airpower’s 
full potential and negate any technological advantage their enemies, particularly Taiwan, 
may possess. The plan for PLAAF modernization is designed to indoctrinate PLAAF 
pilots with intense combat doctrine and allow the training time necessary for success. The 
                                                 




modernization is also dedicated towards replacing older aircraft with newer airframes, 
both foreign and indigenous, to eradicate ROC air superiority in the Taiwan Strait.  
The PLAAF’s modernization is primarily concerned with overcoming Taiwan’s 
technological superiority and developing doctrine to conduct joint operations with air, 
land and sea forces in aggressive action against Taiwan. To aid in this effort, the PLAAF 
is developing a rapid reaction airborne unit designed to penetrate deep into Taiwanese 
territory and support follow-on PLA units. An integrated air defense system is also being 
developed to defeat ROC or U.S. cruise missile or aircraft attack on the mainland. This 
chapter discusses the progress of modernizing PLAAF aircraft, the efforts to build a 
comprehensive training doctrine, and the development of its airborne units. The chapter 
also discusses the development of the PLAAF’s air defense forces.     
B. AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATIONS 
1.  Fighters 
The majority of PLAAF aircraft are obsolete. Due to political and civil problems 
in the country, the PRC was unable to develop indigenous aircraft capable of matching 
the advanced aircraft of Taiwan. This inability to manufacture advanced indigenous 
aircraft capable of defending the mainland against air attacks was the one of the PRC’s 
biggest security weaknesses. Although initially helpful in the effort to gain advanced 
aircraft, when the Soviet Union withdrew its military assistance in the late 1950s, the 
PLAAF was placed in dire straits because it no longer had access to advanced aircraft. 
Although it received numerous Soviet airframes with their production rights, the political 
fallout between the two countries did not allow the PRC to receive the technical 
blueprints for manufacturing them in China.75 The inability to reverse engineer these 
aircraft made the PLAAF increasingly ineffective and was quickly outmatched by the 
ROC Air Force.  
Until the Persian Gulf War, the PLAAF did not understand the power an 
advanced air force has against its enemies. In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
PRC analysts studied the effectiveness of advanced airpower and how it paralyzed the 
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Iraqi combat and support forces.76 After the Persian Gulf War, the PRC recognized its 
combat capabilities were weak and began efforts to convert its air force into one capable 
of not only providing long-range strikes, but also of providing close air support to its 
ground troops. The PLAAF is working to retire its older airframes, augment its air fleet 
with advanced combat aircraft from both indigenous and foreign sources and procure 
long-range bombers.  
The PLAAF currently has 3200 aircraft in its arsenal, most of which are of 
obsolete Soviet design.77 The majority of these aircraft are the obsolete J-6s, the Chinese 
produced MiG-19. Due to its large number, the J-6 is deployed throughout the PRC, but 
particularly in the airfields across from Taiwan. However, the J-6 provides little defense 
against the advanced F-16 Falcons of the ROC Air Force. The J-6 has a small combat 
radius, which does not allow for air operations over Taiwan, and is armed only with 
short-range guns and infrared missiles that are easily decoyed by flares. Due to their 
number and the lack of numerous advance aircraft, a large portion of PLAAF resources 
are used to keep the J-6 fleet operational. This diversion of funds forces the PLAAF to 
deviate resources from other PLAAF projects. The PLAAF intends to retire all of its J-6 
aircraft by the end of the decade in order to devote its resources to modifying better 
maintained aircraft with newer avionics. 
The PLAAF is currently in the process of modernizing existing airframes that 
have the potential for air combat against Taiwan. The J-7, the Chinese MiG-21, and the 
indigenously produced J-8 have been modified with advanced avionics and weapons 
systems. These modifications have been conducted to allow the aircraft to combat any 
EW threat and provide the PLAAF with an all-weather fighter. The J-7 and J-8 have also 
been modified to carry the Chinese versions of Soviet air-to-air missiles (AAM). 
However, due to its older technology and lack of sufficient combat capability, the J-7 and 
J-8 provide little more than a numerical advantage against ROC forces. Both aircraft have 
a combat radius of approximately 300nm, but, like the J-6, will provide little help in air 
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combat against Taiwan.78 While the modifications provide the PLAAF with a better 
aircraft, the J-7 and J-8 are still relatively ineffective against the ROC’s modern combat 
aircraft. 
  The PLAAF recognizes that it cannot establish air superiority over the Taiwan 
Strait without a fighter capable of competing with the ROC F-16s and the U.S. military 
jets that may defend Taiwan. In the period following the Persian Gulf War, the PLAAF 
began research to develop an air superiority fighter, but due to the lack of indigenous 
technology, the PRC has been unable to develop one. In an effort to gain an air 
superiority fighter, the PRC negotiated with Russia to buy the Su-27 Flanker.79 The 
purchase of the Su-27 will prove to be one of the best decisions for the PLAAF. The Su-
27 Flanker is the only fighter in the PLAAF inventory capable of establishing a combat 
air patrol station over the Taiwan Strait. The majority of the Su-27s are deployed at the 
airfields near the Taiwan Strait and are capable of launching raids into Taiwan. The Su-
27 has a range of 930 miles, can refuel in-flight, and can travel at a maximum speed of 
Mach 2.5. The Su-27 is usually compared to the U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagle due to its 
superior maneuverability and advanced avionics capable of firing modern air-to-air 
weaponry, including long-range AAMs.80 This fighter will prove an excellent air-to-air 
platform against the ROC air force if the PLAAF effectively implements it. 
Although, the Su-27 augments the PLAAF air-to-air inventory, the PLAAF must 
overcome several logistical and administrative problems to ensure its effectiveness. First, 
the SU-27s constitutes only a small percentage of the actual PLAAF inventory. The PRC 
has yet to acquire all of the contracted seventy-eight Su-27s from Russia.81 Without the 
full complement of these Su-27s, and any more negotiated in the future, the PLAAF will 
not have the aircraft available to replace its retiring obsolete fleet. Also, during the 
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negotiation for the Su-27s, the Russians agreed to give the PRC the production rights for 
the aircraft. However, the infrastructure to build the SU-27s, renamed the J-11 for the 
PLAAF, is not in place. This fact was underscored to the PLAAF when it failed to meet 
its own production goals. The PLAAF was scheduled to produce 15 J-11s by 2002, but 
could only produce six.82 Without the infrastructure to mass produce the Chinese Su-27s 
quickly for the near term, the rapid acceleration of advanced technology in United States 
research and development (R&D) will negate the advantage the Su-27 Flanker has in the 
PLAAF inventory. 
Along with the Su-27 Flanker, the PRC is negotiating with Russia to purchase 
another advanced aircraft with the capabilities to conduct long-range, all-weather 
engagements for both air and ground combat. The Su-30 MK has many capabilities 
similar to the Su-27, but is equipped with more advanced avionics, can travel farther, 
carries more state-of-the-art ordnance, and with modifications has the ability for naval 
combat. Reportedly, the PLANAF is negotiating with Russia to acquire the modified 
naval version of the Su-30 armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), specifically 
designing the jet for anti-surface warfare.83 This is due to the PLANAF not yet receiving 
the Su-27 Flankers for its own inventory. Russia signed a contract with the PRC in 1999 
to deliver forty Su-30s, along with Russian help to produce the aircraft in the PRC 
indigenously. Although the Russians promised delivery, like the Su-27s, the actual 
number of Su-30s delivered is so far minimal. Also, the necessary infrastructure to 
produce them is not available. Unless the PRC is capable of producing this aircraft, like 
the Su-27, the advantage of this advanced aircraft will quickly disappear. 
The PLAAF cannot continue to rely on foreign acquisitions to augment its 
inventory. To aid in this effort, the PLAAF is the developing the F-10, or J-10, fighter. 
The F-10 is designated an air superiority fighter and will reportedly be used over the 
Taiwan Strait against the ROC Air Force. While producing this aircraft will be a 
tremendous feat for the PRC, the project has been constantly delayed due to research 
problems and an inability to procure the necessary armament. If the PLAAF continues to 
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commit resources to the project, the fighter will not only be decades behind the 
technologically advanced aircraft in the ROC inventory, but the PLAAF reliance on 
foreign military equipment will continue. 
2.  Bombers 
The PLAAF received its first bombers from the Soviet Union during the 1950s. 
After the PLAAF began indigenous production of the bombers, they were re-designated 
as the B-5, modeled after the Il-28 Beagle, and the B-6, modeled after the Tu-16 Badger. 
Since the 1950s, the PLAAF has been unable to produce a bomber capable of effectively 
augmenting their inventory. The result was that the PLAAF bomber inventory became 
ineffective and unfit for combat over Taiwan. The B-5 is rapidly being phased out of the 
PLAAF inventory due to its obsolete design and the inability of the PLAAF to modify the 
aircraft for further operations. The B-6, however, has been successfully modified several 
times and remains an operational platform. One main reason the PRC wants to keep the 
B-6 operational is that it is the only PLAAF bomber capable of carrying a nuclear 
payload. In order to keep the aircraft in its active inventory, the PRC has also designated 
the B-6 as a PLANAF bomber. The difference between the two bombers is that the 
PLANAF bomber is modified to carry ASCMs, while the PLAAF is modified to carry 
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM).84 Due to its poor operational range, roughly 
1000nm, and the PLAAF’s inability to provide the bomber with fighter protection due to 
its current combat doctrine, these bombers would prove insignificant in the battle over 
Taiwan. 
The PRC studied the Persian Gulf War intently, but the most recent war in Iraq, 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, showed the PRC the importance of a long-range bomber 
capability. Peng Guangqian, a military analyst at the PRC’s Academy of Military 
Sciences, paid particularly close attention to the use of U.S. bombers in the war. He saw 
the advantage a long-range bomber had on not only striking deep into Iraqi territory, but 
its ability to conduct multiple strikes along its flight path.85 This study helped renew PRC 
thoughts on the need for an advanced long-range bomber. 
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Following the example of U.S. military forces working to develop the Joint Strike 
Fighter, the PLAAF and PLANAF are working jointly to design and acquire both 
medium and long-range bombers. The PLANAF is reportedly developing an all-weather, 
supersonic, medium-range fighter bomber designed for anti-surface warfare (ASUW), but 
still capable of conducting air strikes over Taiwan for the PLAAF.86 The FB-7 is 
expected to augment both air services strike capability with better avionics, radars and 
weapons. However, like every other indigenous project in the PRC, the research and 
production of the bomber is behind schedule. The FB-7 will not affect the air over the 
Taiwan Strait for at least the next two decades when it was scheduled for completion in 
this decade. In order to augment their long-range bomber capability, the PRC is 
negotiating with Russia to obtain the Tu-22M Backfire.87 While the Tu-22M is able to 
carry a payload over 22 tons, it lacks the capability for in-flight refueling due to prior 
international agreements. This will force the Tu-22M to only carry out limited strikes on 
Taiwan. Although the sale of the Tu-22M has yet to happen, originally due to Russian 
worries over strikes into their country, the recent leasing of four Tu-22Ms to India will 
the force the sale of the bomber to the PRC.88   
3.  Transports 
Compared to the actual size of the PLA--nearly two million troops--the PLAAF 
strategic transport capability is miniscule. From its inception until the mid-1990s, the 
PLAAF has never possessed enough transport aircraft capable of doing the necessary 
work. Not only could the PLAAF transport fleet not transfer enough airborne divisions or 
infantry soldiers to Taiwan in case of an invasion, but it could not fly far into the western 
parts of China for a sustained period of time.89 Unlike the rest of the PLAAF inventory, 
the transports, although obsolete, are being modified for continued use. Also, the PLAAF 
is acquiring foreign transports in an effort to augment its transport capability. The 
PLAAF transport fleet comprises of twenty Il-76MDs, twenty-five Y-8/An-12s and forty-
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two Y-7/An-28s, as well as two C-130L, which are operated by a civilian company.90 
These aircraft are being modified for continued operation and receiving newer engines, as 
well as improved avionics. While the PLAAF is improving its inventory, its transport 
fleet will continue to be ineffective for quite some time. The PLAAF will need to commit 
a significant amount of resources not only to acquire foreign transports, but also to build 
a domestic fleet.  The PRC does not have enough economic resources to devote to 
building a transport fleet, as well as continue to research and develop its other 
modernization programs.    
4.  Special Mission Aircraft 
The U.S. military actions in the Middle East proved to the PRC that conventional 
aircraft alone cannot win air superiority or the battle. The PRC saw that a technologically 
inferior enemy like Iraq was defeated by revolutionary weaponry. This new weaponry 
allowed the U.S. and Coalition forces to be victorious over an enemy that was embedded 
in its own territory and win with minimal manpower. The use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles, air-traffic control aircraft and advanced intelligence gathering platforms will 
prove essential against a more technologically advanced enemy like Taiwan. 
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in combat has proven to be one of 
the greatest technological advancements for a military. UAVs first proved their worth to 
the U.S. military during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The ability for UAVs to 
deliver ordnance on a target, as well as provide intelligence information without risking 
the life of a human being is extremely beneficial. These advantages are why the PLAAF 
is investing considerable resources into the development of UAVs. According to the 
Department of Defense, the PLAAF is developing UAVs not only for electronic warfare 
(EW), but continued surveillance along the Taiwan coast and future combat operations.91 
Since the ROC Air Force does not possess this capability, the use of UAVs in a future 
invasion of Taiwan will prove to be a tremendous advantage for the PLAAF. 
Another advantage an UAV will provide the PRC is command, control and battle 
management (C2BM) during an operation. C2BM provides unprecedented intelligence 
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information to the PLA’s C2. While analyzing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CMC 
understood the effectiveness of U.S. systems like Global Hawk and Predator UAVs.92 
These UAV systems were able to provide U.S. and coalition forces real time information 
on the locations of Iraqi forces. With the location of enemy forces known, the U.S. and 
coalition forces were able to control the movement of forces with greater effectiveness. 
This C2BM ability provided U.S. and coalition forces with information that the PRC 
would like to harness for its forces. If the PLAAF is able to develop UAV systems like 
the Global Hawk, then operations against Taiwan will sway to the PRC’s advantage.    
As the PLAAF modernizes its inventory, the acquisition of an airborne-early-
warning and control system (AWAC) platform will give the PRC a strategic advantage 
over Taiwan. The PRC goal to acquire an AWACs has proven to be one of the 
controversial items for the United States. The most controversial aircraft acquisition for 
the PLAAF is its desire for an AWACs platform. An AWACs platform will provide the 
PLAAF with the capability of airborne control and the ability to provide C4ISR against 
ROC forces. Due to its lack of an AWACs platform, the PLAAF is limited to within 200-
300nm off the coast of China, the operational range of ground-based radar.93 This range 
is far shorter than the operation ranges of ROC or U.S. aircraft and limits the ability for 
land-based aircraft to conduct strikes on Taiwan. The Israelis originally agreed to sell the 
PLAAF an AWACs platform, the Elta Phalcon, but United States pressure forced Israel 
to back away from the deal.  
Once the Israelis decided not to go through with their deal, the PRC looked 
toward Russia once again for its aviation needs. The Russians have agreed to sell the 
PRC four A-50E AWACs. The A-50E is the most advanced Russian AWACS systems 
and boasts an operating system capable of tracking three hundred targets at once, 
command twelve friendly fighters and operate at ranges up to 400nm.94 This AWACs 
system will provide the PLAAF with four hours of on station time and the ability to travel 
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a distance of over 500nm. The PRC has yet to receive the AWACs from Russia, but it 
may in the near future.  
In addition to foreign acquisitions, the PLAAF is working to develop indigenous 
AWACs technology, based on British and Russian technology, but currently it has not 
gone past the conceptual phase. The new indigenous AWACs will be part of the old Y-8 
Skymaster transport frame, but will carry newer technology.95 As with its current weapon 
systems, the PLAAF will most likely only gain AWACs capabilities by foreign 
purchases. 
Intelligence gathering in combat is essential to victory. Current PLAAF 
intelligence platforms are weak and lack the necessary stealth capabilities to gather 
proper intelligence. However, the PLAAF has been involved with several ways, both air 
and land, to augment its C4ISR capability other than through the use of an AWACs 
platform. For the PRC, the more intelligence gathered on Taiwan, the smoother combat 
operations against them will be later. The PRC’s intelligence goals are to collect radio 
and satellite communicant (SATCOM) signals coming from the PRC contested areas, 
especially Taiwan.96  
The PRC is developing means to not only gather intelligence from Taiwan, but 
ensure ways to deny U.S. and ROC forces intelligence on how the PRC is operating. The 
PLAAF is developing air platforms to help augment this capability, but it is far from fully 
accomplishing this goal. Reportedly, the PLAAF has modified four Russian Tu-154M 
aircraft for electronic intelligence (ELINT) in an effort to gain better intelligence on 
Taiwan and deny ROC forces intelligence information on PLA movements.97 The Tu-
154 aircraft also reportedly have ground mapping capabilities able to record ROC 
defensive emplacements on Taiwan. With these modified ELINT aircraft, the PRC 
should be able to gather intelligence over Taiwan that was not able to gather before.  
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5.  Advanced Munitions 
 In the studies conducted by the CMC, precision-guided munitions (PGM) have 
played a more prevalent role in modern combat. The CMC was amazed at the number of 
PGMs used from Operation DESERT STORM to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In 1991, 
the use of PGMs accounted for about ten percent of the ordnance used in the war, while 
in 2003, PGMs accounted for over eighty percent of the ordnance used.98 This shift from 
“dumb” bombs to “smart” bombs showed the PRC that the mainland can be attack from 
almost anywhere. 
 The type of PGMs the CMC began intensive research on were those like the U.S. 
GBU-28/B “smart” gravity bomb. The PRC studied the GBU-28 intently when the U.S. 
Air Force accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the air campaign 
in Kosovo.99 Through its research, the CMC began researching bombs that could be 
satellite-guided, TV-guided and global positioning system (GPS)-guided, and capable of 
delivering 1000-2500 pound bombs with tremendous accuracy. Also, the CMC began 
researching bombs with electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capability for use against computer 
networks, electronic equipment and data transmission lines.100 This research shows the 
PRC is preparing for future combat against an enemy that relies on advanced technology 
for its defense. The intended targets for these advanced weapons are U.S. and ROC 
forces. 
C. AIR DOCTRINES 
 Although the PLAAF is retiring its obsolete aircraft and integrating advanced 
foreign and indigenous aircraft into its inventory, serious doctrinal problems need to be 
overcome in order for them to truly become a modern air force. As the advanced aircraft 
are implemented, the PLAAF is failing to properly change its obsolete doctrines that do 
not allow its pilots the necessary training needed for advanced operational flying. As the 
PLAAF modernizes and studies the air campaigns of U.S. forces, several doctrinal issues 
have arisen for the PLAAF. The doctrinal issues that directly affect the future of PLAAF 
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operations are: the amount of flight time per aircraft, in-flight refueling, and the ability 
for pilots to travel over water. 
 The biggest detriment to the training of PLAAF pilots is the amount of flight time 
each pilot receives for their assigned aircraft. Although pilot training has improved 
greatly over the past twenty years, the amount of flight time received is still well under 
both ROC and U.S. air forces. The average PLAAF pilot trains for only 130 hours a year, 
while U.S. pilots train for 225 hours and ROC pilots train for nearly 180 hours a year.101 
When a PLAAF pilot is flying much of the flight is concerned with practicing basic 
navigational skills, rather than operational flying skills needed to win during air combat 
maneuvering (ACM). Also, most of these training flights are conducted under daytime 
visual flight rules (VFR) due to their hazardous nature.  
While 130 hours is a tremendous increase for a PLAAF pilot, this increase only 
affects the pilots of the less advanced airframes. The pilots of the new Su-27s only 
receive about 100 hours of flight time per year under extremely constrained 
conditions.102 The Su-27s pilots receive less flight time because the PRC leadership is 
worried about damage to its newest fighter, the limited amount of supplies for the aircraft 
and possible defection by its pilots. Along with the small amount of flight time, PLAAF 
pilots rarely train with live ammunition in flight. Continuously training of PLAAF pilots 
in unreal conditions does not allow them to prepare for actual aerial combat in the future. 
Unless the PLAAF leadership changes its combat doctrine, the PLAAF pilots will not be 
able to compete with ROC or U.S. pilots. 
 The inability of the majority of PLAAF pilots to refuel in-flight significantly 
limits the operational range of the PLAAF and limits their ability to conduct sustained 
combat operations.103 In an effort to correct this problem, the PLAAF has conducted 
several in-flight refueling drills for its squadrons, but with minimal results. Not only is 
the PLAAF training its pilots, but it is also converting bombers for refueling training. The 
PLAAF converted a B-6 Badger bomber to an aerial tanker in an effort to aid in this 
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capability. The last successful in-flight refueling for the PLAAF took place over the 
South China in April 2000.104 This inability of in-flight refueling forces the PLAAF to 
station the majority of its combat aircraft on airbases in close proximity to Taiwan. The 
placement of PLAAF aircraft near Taiwan shows the significance the PRC places on air 
power against Taiwan, but without in-flight refueling, it cannot sustain long-term combat 
operations. 
 Another training deficiency for the PLAAF is its reluctance to fly over water. The 
PLAAF leadership believes training flights over the water are inherently more dangerous 
and need to be conducted differently than flights over land.105 The lack of over-water 
flight training reduces the PLAAF’s ability to project its power over ROC forces, gain air 
superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and conduct attacks on Taiwan. In an effort to improve 
its efficiency, the PLAAF has conducted limited daytime flights over the water while 
patrolling the Taiwan Strait. These limited flights are a solid effort, but the are no where 
near the amount of experience PLAAF pilots need. ROC pilots routinely train in over-
water flights to simulate air combat against PLAAF pilots. If the PLAAF does not train 
its pilots more sufficiently in over-water flights, ROC forces will maintain air superiority 
over the Taiwan Strait.  
D. AIRBORNE UNIT 
 The 15th Airborne Corps is the PLA’s only airborne unit. The 15th Corps is unlike 
the rest of the world’s airborne units because the PLAAF is in command of this unit and, 
if necessary, it can come under direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). 
The 15th Corps roots go back to Deng Xiaoping’s 2nd Field Army during the Korean War. 
In Korea, the predecessors of the 15th Corps gained a reputation for combat toughness 
and were designated by Mao Zedong to form their own unit in the 1960s.106 Mao’s 
purpose for the 15th Corps was as a rapid reaction force, but not until the late 1990s did 
the PRC begin any preparations to conduct such operations. While the PRC has grand 
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plans for the 15th Corps, logistical and doctrinal problems force any PRC airborne 
operation to be extremely limited. 
 The 15th Airborne Corps currently consists of 30,000 troops (three divisions) with 
possibly two new divisions being formed.107 Even though the 15th Corps is small 
compared to the rest of the PLA, the PLAAF does not have the strategic airlift capability 
to transport these paratroopers for an operation. The inability of the PLAAF to transport 
the 15th Corps is the biggest restriction to a successful airborne operation against Taiwan. 
To successfully conduct an operation in Taiwan, the PLAAF would need to transport 
more than the fifteen thousand paratroopers, ten thousand more than they can transport 
now. While five thousand paratroopers may be able to establish control of a ROC 
contested airfield or port facility, they can only do it for a short period of time before 
being overrun.108 As noted earlier, even though the PLAAF is modernizing its transport 
inventory, it will not be ready for quite some time. Without a massive transport fleet, the 
15th Corps will not pose a significant problem to Taiwan. 
Despite significant logistical problems, the doctrine of the 15th Corps also hinders 
successful operations. Although the PRC has lofty expectations for the 15th Corps in the 
21st century--particularly the capability to airdrop 100,000 paratroopers early this 
century-- several doctrinal issues need to be addressed.109 First, the 15th Corps does not 
have the modern equipment necessary for night-time airborne drops. A night-time drop 
on Taiwan would have the best chance for success. The use of night vision goggles 
(NVG) allows airborne commanders to not only see the approaching drop zone (DZ), but 
allows for safer and more efficient movement at night. Also, the 15th Corps is severely 
limited by its inability to operate in inclement weather.110 Without the equipment 
necessary to airdrop into a contested DZ during poor weather, the 15th Corps chances of 
success drop dramatically. If the 15th Corps continues to limit operations only to daylight 
and fair weather operations, then its effectiveness as a fighting force will be negated. 
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The second problem of the 15th Corps is its lack of doctrinal training. The PRC 
wants the 15th Corps to play a prominent role in an invasion of Taiwan. However, the 15th 
Corps has failed to instill in its smaller units the basic doctrinal procedures of simple 
airborne tactics. Although the 15th Corps has studied extensively numerous airborne 
campaigns of past wars, it has failed to fully implement the lessons learned from those 
campaigns. The 15th Corps biggest failure is its inability to effectively work jointly with 
another PRC force. The use of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division during Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM is currently under PRC review, but which lessons will be implemented is still 
unknown.111 The PRC is particularly concerned with the joint operations between the 
101st Airborne and the ground forces around Baghdad. The CMC leadership is amazed at 
the success of the 101st Airborne taking over objectives in Northern Iraq, then traveling 
south in time to combine its efforts with the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division around 
Baghdad.   
To augment their airborne capability, the PLAAF has requested the help from 
Russian Airborne forces to train the 15th Corps. The Russian advisors are training the 15th 
Corps not only to mobilize it into an effective rapid reaction force, but also to work 
jointly with the rest of the PLA’s combat arms. As its training progresses, the Russian 
advisors are using training scenarios for the 15th Corps that have significant overtones of 
an operation against Taiwan. Due to the large number of PLAAF paratroopers needed for 
an airborne invasion of Taiwan, the Russian advisors are slowly preparing the 15th Corps 
for such an operation.112 With the help of Russian advisors, the 15th Corps should be able 
to airdrop a division of paratroopers, with light tanks and self-propelled guns, and operate 
as an independent force. However, the training process for the 15th Corps is slow and 
cumbersome and will not show significant results for quite some time.    
E. AIR DEFENSES 
 A distinct branch of the PLAAF’s combat capability is its air defenses. Recent 
actions by the PLAAF have shown it committing significant resources to modernizing air 
defenses. The PLAAF divides its air defenses into three branches: surface-to-air missiles 
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(SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and radar troops.113 Each branch is designed defeat 
attacks against the mainland, but the main purpose behind modernizing the PLAAF air 
defense capability is preparing for operations against Taiwan. The PRC understands its 
air defense capability is generations behind Taiwan’s and U.S. capabilities, but wants to 
ensure its future success against attacks. In preparation, the PLAAF is working to create a 
coherent integrated air defense system (IADS) to combat this possible future threat.  
 The first step towards a coherent IADS is SAMs. As with much of the PLA’s 
inventory, the SAMs in the PLAAF are obsolete, but a few have been modified for 
extended service. According to PLAAF doctrine, SAMs are designed to work jointly with 
PLA infantry. As the PLA infantry make a forward advance, SAMs are used against 
enemy attack aircraft or missile attacks.114 There are several types of SAMs in the current 
PLAAF inventory. These SAM systems range from shoulder-fired, fixed and mobile to 
radio and radar homing missiles, but most are obsolete and cannot defeat ROC attacks.  
In an effort to modernize its SAMs systems, the PLAAF has purchased from 
Russia numerous SAM systems designed to destroy ROC attack aircraft, as well as their 
ISR capability. The most advanced SAM purchased from Russia is the SA-10. The SA-
10 compares to the U.S. Patriot system in its capability. The SA-10 is designed to destroy 
incoming ROC cruise missiles and the majority of PRC SA-10s batteries are located 
along the Taiwan Strait. Also, the PLAAF has developed an advanced indigenous SAM 
based on the SA-10 and is currently deploying this missile along the coast of the Taiwan 
Strait, as well.115 More advanced SAMs, with advanced radar guidance and faster speeds, 
are quickly being tested and deployed along the Taiwan Strait in defense against Taiwan. 
The most significant SAM system being developed by the PLAAF is based on 
anti-radiation missile technology. The PRC received numerous missiles from Israel with 
this technology and its development could be detrimental to ROC and U.S. forces. The 
two systems in development, the FT-2000 and FT-2000A SAM systems, are designed to 
destroy AWACs and radio-emitting platforms.116 The sole purpose of these missiles is to 
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destroy ROC or U.S. aircraft patrolling the Taiwan Strait on C4ISR missions against the 
PRC. Although both systems are still in the conceptual phase, the amount of resources 
committed to their development shows how important it is to the defense of the PRC 
against ROC attacks. 
 The next branch of the PLAAF’s IADS is AAA. AAA units will continue to play 
a large part of the IADS until the SAMs systems are fully modernized. The PLAAF still 
considers AAA an effective weapon against low-level attack aircraft and transports. For 
this reason, a large number of AAA units are still active along the coast of the Taiwan 
Strait in case of ROC attacks. The AAA units along the coast are modified with advanced 
fire control systems allowing for a better rapid response capability and radar guidance. 
However, as the more advanced SAM systems become fully implemented into the IADS, 
the AAA units will start to be decommissioned.117 Fortunately for Taiwan, the AAA 
branch of IADS will remain active for some time. 
 The last branch in the IADS is the units designed for radar control. The PLAAF 
has developed and deployed numerous radars designed to conduct surveillance on 
Taiwan, as well as participate in EW. The PLAAF deployed both 2-D and 3-D radars that 
employ numerous electronic counter measures (ECM) capabilities against enemy attack 
aircraft.118 Without triggering enemy aircraft, PLAAF radar stations will not be subject to 
counterattack when the radar stations target the aircraft for prosecution. These deployed 
radars are limited by the number of targets they can track and the range of the radars, but 
they are plentiful enough throughout the area to make these operational limits minimal.   
In an effort to augment its radar capability, the PLA is developing numerous 
radars designed for longer range and higher altitudes. The biggest conceptual 
development in this effort is a phased array radar. This radar will allow the PLAAF to 
focus high powered radar beams in a specific direction to achieve longer ranges for the 
tracking of ROC targets. The PLAAF is also using this technology to defeat U.S. stealth 
aircraft. This radar concept is passive-coherent detection. The radar is designed to detect 
disturbances in television broadcast signals and radar emissions in the hopes to detect 
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stealth aircraft.119 Like the developmental SAM systems, these new radar systems will 
allow the PLAAF not only to effectively track United States and ROC aircraft, but also to 
provide early warning information for PLAAF attack aircraft. 
F. SUMMARY 
The PLAAF is unable to conduct a successful attack on Taiwan with its current 
inventory. Current PLAAF doctrine does not allow its pilots to train for sustain air 
operations or allow it to gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. However, the 
modernization programs employed by the PLAAF are slowly eradicating these 
deficiencies. Through intense study of the U.S. air campaigns in the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe, the PLAAF realizes the potential a modernized air force can give it. The 
few combat aircraft purchased from Russia has allowed the PLAAF the chance to gain air 
superiority over the Taiwan Strait, but there are not enough aircraft to sustain it.  
In order to maintain that superiority, the PLAAF needs to correct the deficiencies 
of its air doctrines. The PLAAF is slowly training its forces in effective combat 
formations, in-flight refueling and sustained operations over the water, but these 
doctrines take some time to implement effectively. Also, the slow advancement of the 
PLAAF’s transport fleet will not allow the 15th Airborne Corps to see its full potential for 
years to come. If the PRC engages its forces in an operation against Taiwan, then the 
IADS will allow the mainland to defend itself against counterattack from ROC or U.S. 
forces once the advanced SAM systems are fully integrated. These PLAAF 
modernizations are slow, but, once fully implemented, the PLAAF will become an 
effective fighting force.   
                                                 




V.  PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY SECOND ARTILLERY 
CORPS 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 The PRC’s goal is to coerce Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. A modern 
strategic missile force (SMF) is one of the PRC’s best tools for success. In an effort to 
reunify Taiwan, the Second Artillery Corps was officially formed in the 1966. When the 
Second Artillery Corps was formed, its original intent was for it to be an extension of the 
PLA’s artillery units.120 Throughout its forty-year history, the SMF evolved to display 
the PRC’s might in the nuclear world. Unlike the rest of the services in the PLA, the 
Second Artillery Corps is the most modern unit in the PLA. This is so for two reasons. 
First, the PRC expects that the SMF will be one of its most effective weapons against 
Taiwan in the coming years. In 1985, as Deng Xiaoping called for a reduction in troop 
strength throughout the PLA, the SMF not only remained untouched, but also grew in 
both personnel and budget.121 Second, the PRC wants a modern missile force to deter the 
only military force capable of effectively protecting Taiwan, the United States. The 
increase in the Second Artillery Corps stature shows the importance the CMC attaches to 
its missile forces and gives a glimpse of its future use in deterring Taiwan from declaring 
independence and coercing it to accept reunification.122  
 Since its inception, the SMF has maintained both conventional and nuclear 
missiles. The exact number of missiles in the PRC’s inventory is unknown, but reports 
show a drastic increase in the quantitative and qualitative nature of these missiles. 
Although the number of nuclear missiles in the PRC is growing, PRC policy states it will 
not use a nuclear weapon first against any of its enemies. However, according to the 2003 
Department of Defense report on PRC military strength, PRC strategists are 
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reconsidering revoking its “no first use” pledge against U.S. forces in the area.123 This 
reconsideration will no doubt affect Taiwan and foreign forces in the event of aggression 
action by the PRC. 
 As the Second Artillery Corps continues to modernize itself with the newer 
missiles designed for longer ranges and carry a variety of payloads, the United States and 
the ROC will need to pay closer attention to the growth of the PRC’s SMF. The PRC is 
stockpiling hundreds of short-range missiles near the Taiwan Strait in an effort to coerce 
a reunification.124 These missiles do not include the thousands of missiles, both 
conventional and nuclear, the PRC has dedicated to stopping U.S. involvement in the 
defense of Taiwan. In effort to counter this PRC nuclear and short-range missile 
capability, the United States is developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. 
The intent of BMD is to stop incoming missile attacks from the PRC on Taiwan and 
military sites throughout the western Pacific. The establishment of a BMD system has not 
only strategic implications, but diplomatic ones as well.  
This chapter discusses the types of missiles, both conventional and nuclear, the 
PRC has in its inventory and the efforts taken by the PRC to keep its SMF modernized. 
Also, this chapter discusses the ramifications a U.S. BMD system has for Taiwan and the 
PRC.  
B. CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR MISSILES 
 The increase in the number of SMF missiles is primarily concerned with deterring 
the United States from getting involved in the defense of Taiwan. The PRC is preparing 
the SMF for U.S. involvement in Taiwan during reunification operations. In order to 
deter U.S. military forces in the area, the PRC is relying on its missiles to effectively 
engage ROC defenses, bypass U.S. missile defenses, and possibly deter the United States 
from even coming to Taiwan’s aid. Even though the United States and the ROC’s 
militaries are qualitatively better, the CMC is assured the SMF is capable of defeating 
these forces in combat. To ensure this in combat, the SMF is focusing its missile 
modernization to ensure survivability during launch procedures and engagements, the 
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ability to strike targets at longer ranges, and ensure greater accuracy after launch.125 Also, 
the PRC is modernizing its inventory with newer missiles with advanced technology 
designed to strike deeper and more accurately into Taiwan and the United States.  
1.  Short and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles 
The deployment and pat use of short and medium-range ballistic missiles is the 
PRC’s primary military tool used to coerce Taiwan’s reunification.126 Since missiles are 
relatively inexpensive and growing rapidly in technology, the PRC is able to deploy 
hundreds of missiles along the Taiwan Strait to make the ROC understand how 
committed the PRC is to reunification. During several times in its history, the PRC has 
launched missiles at and near Taiwan, most recently in 1996, to remind the ROC it has 
not wavered from this position. Even though the PRC has neglected its conventional short 
and medium-range missile capability in the past, the PRC more recently has emphasized 
an increase of advanced short and medium-range missiles to target Taiwan. Since a 
nuclear strike is not an option on Taiwan, the payloads of conventional missiles allow not 
only for a large quantity, but allow for joint operations with approaching PLA infantry 
units on Taiwan.127  
According to Chinese doctrine, the employment of short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM) in combat not only allows for surprise, but also for disarming first strikes on 
Taiwan in order to gain the initiative during the initial phases of combat.128 Currently, the 
PRC has deployed 350-400 SRBMs across from Taiwan, and the number is expected to 
rise to approximately to 600 by 2010.129 As this missile inventory grows, so does the 
technology of their systems. The two SRBMs currently operational in the Second 
Artillery Corps inventory, the DF-15 and the DF-11, have both been modified with 
advanced fire control systems for continued service against Taiwan. 
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The DF-15, or M-9, entered the PLA inventory in 1995 and has quickly 
become the backbone of the PLA’s SRBMs. The DF-15 is a mobile, solid-fueled SRBM 
that has a range of 375nm and a circular error probability (CEP) of 100-meters. When 
designing the DF-15, the PRC recognized that a mobile missile could be moved easily 
from different locations and hidden from U.S. satellite or aerial reconnaissance 
aircraft.130 The PRC received the idea of a mobile SRBM from Iraqi forces during the 
Persian Gulf War. The U.S. and coalition forces had a difficult time locating and 
destroying the Iraqi mobile SCUD missiles and Beijing saw that this would be 
advantageous for them against the ROC and United States in the future. 
The DF-15 quickly came to prominence during the PRC military exercises 
off Taiwan during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. During that time, the PRC 
launched two sorties of missiles towards Taiwan. In July 1995, the PRC fired six DF-15 
SRBMs during a “defensive” missile employment against the ROC. Then, in March 
1996, the PRC launched four more DF-15 SRBMs off the coast of Taiwan to remind the 
ROC of the “one China” policy.131 During the time between these launches the guidance 
systems in the DF-15 were greatly improved. The DF-15s were provided with a strap-
down inertial navigation system (INS) designed to launch the missile on a predetermined 
flight plan other than launched in one direction as before.132 The Chinese INS system 
onboard the DF-15 allowed a higher degree of accuracy that the PRC did not possess 
before. The PRC is reportedly developing a DF-15 capable of longer ranges possibly 
equipped with a Chinese GPS version.133 The GPS system will allow the DF-15 to be 
even more accurate after launch. With a large number of DF-15s opposite Taiwan and its 
short launch cycle (six to seven minutes), the missile can force a debilitating attack on 
Taiwan. 
                                                 
130 Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), p. 56. 
131 Porch, pp. 19-20. 
132 Bracken, p. 57. 




Another issue with the DF-15 off the coast of Taiwan is its detachable 
warhead. The detached warhead can change its trajectory in-flight and follow a different 
path than the actual missile. The DF-15s warhead separation will inevitably ensure 
greater targeting difficulty by ROC or U.S. forces. Another issue with the DF-15 warhead 
is the variety of payloads it can carry. According to the 1999 U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (also known as the 
Cox Report) report, the PRC can outfit the DF-15 with nuclear warheads or a neutron 
bomb.134 While the use of a neutron bomb on Taiwan is highly unlikely, due to the 
PRC’s stake in a stable and economically thriving Taiwan, the threat must still be 
addressed by military planners.  
b. DF-11    
The DF-11, or M-11, is the second SRBM in the active PLA inventory. 
The DF-11 is a mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 200nm. The DF-11 is now 
believed to incorporate the same INS as the DF-15. While the DF-11 may have many of 
the same attributes as the DF-15, the DF-11 has two main differences. First, the DF-11 
carries a larger warhead, about 800kg with a 150-meter CEP. Second, the flight time for 
the DF-11 is half as long as the DF-15. This will make missile defense systems on 
Taiwan hard pressed to target and engage the DF-11 once launched.135 Reportedly, the 
PRC is trying to develop a long-range version of the DF-11 with GPS, as well. As the 
DF-11 inventory grows, the missile defenses on Taiwan need to be prepared for this 
emerging threat. 
c. DF-21 
 The DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is currently replacing 
the older DF-2 as its new tactical nuclear missile.136 The DF-21 is a mobile, solid-
propellant ballistic missile able to carry a 600kg warhead, travel over 1000nm and carry a 
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nuclear payload.137 Currently, the MRBM is equipped only for nuclear missions due to 
its CEP of 700-meters. However, the PRC is researching whether the DF-21 can be 
outfitted with a conventional warhead and a terminal guidance system to allow for greater 
accuracy. If this is possible, the DF-21 will be a significant weapon against Taiwan and 
the United States, particularly forces stationed in Japan, due to insufficient missile 
defenses currently available.138 (See Figure 2 for PRC missile sites against Taiwan.)  
 Another concern for U.S. forces operating around Taiwan and the western 
Pacific is the development of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) based on 
the DF-21. The JL-1 reportedly has a range of 1200nm and will be deployed on the Xia 
SSBN.139 Although, the missile has yet to be deployed on the Xia, mainly due to the 
submarine’s poor operational record, the PRC intends to produce up to six submarines 
capable of firing this SLBM.140 The PRC’s goal of producing six SSBNs capable of 
firing this SLBM is still far into the future and is quite a lofty goal based on past R&D 
performance. The employment of the JL-1, whether with a nuclear or conventional 
warhead, on a operating PLAN submarine will force ROC and U.S. forces operating in 
the area to move about cautiously. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the 
deployment of the JL-1 SLBM on the Xia is scheduled for 2003.141 However, it is not yet 
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Location of SRBM sites aimed at Taiwan. 
 
Figure 2.   Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/taiwan-geo.htm. 
 
2.  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
 According to their 2002 National Defense White Paper, the PRC has consistently 
advocated the complete destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons and all forms of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Also, the PRC believes it exercises the utmost 
restraint by maintaining the lowest level of nuclear weapons in its arsenal for self-defense 
purposes only.142 However, its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) inventory, the 
missiles capable of striking the United States and its allies throughout Asia, continues to 
grow. According to the Department of Defense, the PRC’s number of ICBMs targeted at 
the United States may rise from twenty to thirty by 2005 and sixty by 2010.143 While the 
use of a WMD weapon is unlikely in the reunification of Taiwan, this is not the purpose 
behind the increase in the PRC’s ICBM inventory. The PRC hopes its ICBM inventory 
will deter the United States, or any foreign nations, from interfering with the reunification 
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of Taiwan for fear of a nuclear attack. Currently, the PRC relies on four operational and 
developmental ICBMs and one in development for its nuclear deterrence. These missiles 
are the DF-4, DF-5, DF-31 and DF-41.  
a. DF-4 
 The DF-4 is the oldest weapon in the PRC’s nuclear arsenal. The original 
purpose of the DF-4 was to give the PRC the ability to strike U.S. bases in the Philippines 
and Guam.144 Being the oldest weapon, the DF-4 is the most technologically inferior 
ICBM in the PRC inventory. The DF-4s warhead is 2200kg (roughly 1-3 megatons) and 
has a range of approximately 1700nm. The DF-4 is can easily be targeted because it is 
deployed in fixed underground silos and needs a significant amount of preparation time 
for launch. In an effort to diversify the missile’s use, the PRC uses the DF-4 to launch 
Chinese satellites into space.145 With China’s effort into space growing, the DF-4 could 
be used to target U.S. satellites capable of gathering intelligence on the PRC or military 
satellites capable of providing the United States with GPS information. The DF-4’s 
ability to launch into space makes it a weapon the PRC could use against U.S. satellites 
during combat operations. The DF-4 was used in China’s first attempt to test MIRV 
technology on ICBMs, but this was unsuccessful due the large warhead size. The 
majority of DF-4 ICBMs have been decommissioned, but the PRC is planning to retain 
about a dozen until the end of the decade.146 
b. DF-5 
 Developed at the same time as the DF-4, the DF-5 was designed to attack 
the continental United States and has become the main PRC nuclear threat against the 
United States.147 The DF-5 ICBM is deployed in approximately twenty silos throughout 
the PRC and all are reportedly targeted at the United States. The DF-5 is a single warhead 
weapon with a 2200kg (3-5 megatons), has a range of approximately 9000nm, and 
requires a long time for launch preparation. Due to its long preparation time and the 
ability for the United States to strike the DF-5 while still in its silos, the PRC intends to 
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replace all of the twenty DF-5 with a longer range, mobile and more accurate version by 
the end of the decade.148  
c. DF-31 
 The DF-31 is the PRC’s ICBM of choice for the future. The DF-31 was 
designed to compensate for the deficiencies of the earlier PRC ICBMs. The DF-31 is a 
road-mobile, solid-fueled missile with a short launch preparation time and is therefore 
difficult to track by the U.S. military. Reportedly, the DF-31 will increase its lethality by 
being linked to the Chinese GPS version through an INS.149 A GPS onboard the ICBM 
will allow the missile to change course in mid-flight, via computer, and attack a target 
other than the one originally designated. If the DF-31 is outfitted with this capability, the 
ICBM will be incredibly difficult to track and destroy by U.S. missile defenses. With its 
range of approximately 5000nm, the DF-31 is replacing the DF-4 and assuming its role 
for targeting the United States.150  
The DF-31 will most likely be used to continue the PRC’s attempts to 
adapt MIRV technology on its ICBMs. The Cox Report states that the PRC is 
aggressively trying to develop MIRV technology for its ICBMs and asserts the PRC will 
be able to deploy 1000 thermonuclear warheads on its ICBMs by 2015.151 If the PRC is 
able to deploy MIRV technology on an ICBM that can target Hawaii, Alaska and the 
west coast of the United States, it may prove a major influence to the United States’ 
decision to aid Taiwan. However, it is still unclear whether the PRC feels has decided 
that MIRV technology, instead of a single warhead, will be cheaper to maintain for its 
ICBMs.152 
d. JL-2 
 As mentioned earlier, the PRC is developing its nuclear arsenal for sea-
based operations. The JL-2 is the sea-based version of the DF-31 and is expected to be 
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deployed on the PRC’s newest SSBN, the Type-094, by 2010.153 The JL-2 may allow the 
PRC to bring its nuclear deterrent to the open ocean and also to deter U.S. forces close to 
PRC waters. The Cox Report speculates that the JL-2 would change PRC tactics by 
allowing its SSBN’s to operate near the mainland, or possibly the eastern side of Taiwan, 
and engage U.S. targets.154 This tactical change is due to the possible employment of a 
protective shroud around the warhead of SLBM. However, with the Type-094 still in 
development and the Xia hardly operational, this tactical change seems highly unlikely 
for some time.  
e. DF-41 
 The DF-41 is the longer range version of the DF-31. This ICBM will 
ultimately replace the DF-5. Because there have been no flight tests, not much is known 
about the missile. The DF-41 is expected to have a range of 7400nm, a range that would  
allow it to reach the east coast of the United States. The DF-41 is expected to have an 
INS with GPS capability and may be deployed in ground silos or in mobile trailers.155 If 
the PRC is able to develop the technology and equip the DF-31 with MIRVs, then the 
development of the DF-41 will most likely encompass deploying MIRVs as well. Some 
reports expect the DF-41 to carry as few as three MIRVs and as many as nine when it 
becomes operational.156 The Department of Defense expects the DF-41 to be deployed in 
the PRC between 2005 and 2010.157  
3.  Cruise Missile Technology 
The use of cruise missiles will directly affect actual operations against Taiwan in 
the future. PRC cruise missiles, as noted earlier, are used throughout the PLA in a variety 
of manners. The PRC is committing significant resources to developing cruise missiles 
that rival those in the U.S. and ROC arsenals. When researching the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, the PRC was amazed by the performance of U.S. and allied cruise missiles, 
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particularly the TOMAHAWK.158 Based on its research, the PRC is modernizing its 
cruise missiles with advanced technology to target accurately Taiwan in a first strike. 
Accurate cruise missile attacks would not only allow the destruction of ROC defenses, 
but minimize the destruction of Taiwan’s infrastructure for later use by the PRC. 
The PRC is developing terrain contour mapping (TERCOM), digital satellite 
matching (DSMAC) and GPS navigation technology for use in its cruise missiles. This 
technology is common with U.S. missiles launched in combat, and the PRC wants it for 
the modernization of its forces.  
a. TERCOM 
Increased accuracy is critical to the modernization of the PRC’s cruise 
missiles. Prior intelligence and advanced technology will allow the PRC to achieve this 
capability. TERCOM allows cruise missiles to follow preprogrammed flights using 
digital maps in their data bases.159 Not only does TERCOM allow for greater accuracy 
against targets, but the mapping system, along with good prior intelligence, will allow the 
PRC to program its cruise missiles to bypass ROC missile defenses when engaging its 
intended target.  
b. DSMAC 
Another technology essential to increased accuracy is digital mapping. 
Digital mapping allows for increased target resolution, via satellites, which will help 
ensure PRC cruise missiles engage their assigned targets. DSMAC technology, combined 
with TERCOM, augments a cruise missile’s capability to bypass missile defenses, and 
helps ensure higher strike accuracy to avoid unnecessary collateral damage.160 Since 
DSMAC needs satellite information, the recent and future PRC space launches will aid in 
further utilizing this technology in combat.  
c. GPS 
Finally, GPS guidance, technology the PRC will either develop 
indigenously or with help from Russia, is almost within China’s capability. As noted 
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earlier, the PRC is trying to apply GPS to its current and developmental missile systems. 
GPS guidance will not only allow for greater accuracy of a pre-programmed flight path, 
but will give the PRC the ability to change the flight paths of its cruise missiles during 
actual employment in combat via computer on the mainland. As this technology is 
developed and implemented, GPS will provide the PRC a tremendous advantage over the 
ROC due to its ability to strike mobile ROC target during real-time.  
C. MISSILE DEFENSE 
BMD is an extremely controversial subject between the United States and the 
PRC.161 The PRC released the following statement about BMD in the western Pacific in 
its 2002 White Paper on National Defense: 
China is concerned about certain countries’ joint research and 
development of theater missile defense (TMD) systems with a view to 
their deployment in the Northeast Asian region. This will lead to the 
proliferation of advanced missile technology and be detrimental to peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. China resolutely opposes any 
country which provides Taiwan with TMD assistance or protection in any 
form.162  
 
Strategically, due to the PRC’s reliance on missiles in a confrontation with the 
ROC, the stationing of a BMD system would negate the effectiveness of a missile attack 
on Taiwan. Politically, the PRC contends that a BMD system stationed in or around 
Taiwan would violate commitments in normalizing U.S.-PRC relations and imply that 
Taiwan is an independent state.163 The PRC considers none of these outcomes as 
favorable. 
Currently, there are two types of BMD systems in development: a land-based and 
sea-based system. Both systems would prove a serious deterrent against a PRC attack on 
Taiwan.  
1. Land-based 
The PRC missiles across the Taiwan Strait have forced Taiwan to modernize its 
missile defenses. Due to the United States refusal to sell the ACS to Taiwan, the ROC is 
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reliant upon land-based systems. Taiwan has deployed four batteries of the Modified Air 
Defense System (MADS), a variant of the PATRIOT system (PAC-2 Plus).164 This 
system has only a moderate success rate and is designed for continuous upgrades. 
Throughout the deployment of the MADS in Taiwan, the PRC voiced it 
objections to Washington. The PRC said emphatically that diplomatic relations between 
the United States and China would be in dire straits. Despite the rhetoric between the two 
countries, the diplomatic efforts from countries have continued to improve. In an effort to 
reassure the ROC that the United States was committed to its security, the United States 
has offered the PATRIOT PAC-3 missile defense system.165 
The PAC-3 is the newest variant of the PATRIOT system and is able to track 
multiple targets with greater accuracy and response from its operators. The PAC-3 is a 
mobile, lower-tier system designed to engage short and medium-range ballistic missiles, 
cruise missiles and aircraft. The PAC-3s best advancement is the use of hit-to-kill 
technology instead of a proximity fuse employed in previous versions. Recent operational 
results from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM showed that the PAC-3 was able to provide an 
adequate missile defense, but that it still needed numerous modifications. The operational 
success of the PAC-3 in combat makes it a highly desired by the ROC. Despite the 
possible receipt of the PAC-3, the PRC feels confident it has sufficient enough forces to 
defeat ROC defenses.166 
The second land-based BMD system is still in development and desired by 
Taiwan when it becomes operational. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
is designed to engage medium and long-range ballistic missiles. The THAAD system is 
intended to engage incoming missiles inside or outside the atmosphere.167 The 
technology of the THAAD system will ensure the missile is not susceptible to decoys and 
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will become part of a C2BM system linking it to other defensive measures. The THAAD 
system is scheduled for deployment by 2007.168 
2. Sea-based 
The sea-based BMD system will be deployed on U.S. Navy warships equipped 
with the ACS. The AEGIS BMD, formerly known as the Navy Area Wide system, will 
use the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) for engagement. The primary focus of the AEGIS 
BMD system is to counter short and medium-range ballistic missiles. With more 
development in the future, the AEGIS BMD will hope to engage ICBMs. The AEGIS 
BMD will build upon the SM-3 structure already in place on both Ticonderoga-class 
cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The AEGIS BMD is scheduled for 
deployment in 2006.169 
D. SUMMARY 
The missile inventory of the Second Artillery Corps is rapidly increasing by 
means of indigenous technology. The PRC is not relying on foreign acquisitions to 
modernize and build up its strategic missile force. Indigenous technology, foreign 
advanced tracking and intensive study of U.S. missiles in combat is guiding the PRC to 
deploy an unprecedented number of short, medium and long-range missiles against 
Taiwan and the United States. The PRC’s missile inventory serves a two-fold purpose. 
First, with enough short and medium-range missiles deployed along the Taiwan Strait, 
the PRC hopes to coerce the ROC into reunification. Second, the PRC hopes the long-
range ICBMs in its inventory will deter the United States from aiding Taiwan during an 
aggressive reunification.  
Due to this missile threat, the United States is developing a cohesive missile 
defense system capable of engaging PRC missiles fired at Taiwan or the United States. 
Although not fully developed, the deployment of U.S. BMD system on Taiwan, at sea on 
U.S. Navy ships, and elsewhere in the western Pacific has proven diplomatically 
troublesome for the United States and the PRC. If the United States deploys the advanced 
BMD systems to Taiwan, the PRC will believe that the United States is once again 
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moving towards recognizing Taiwan as an independent state. While diplomatic actions 
between the two countries cannot be stopped, the PRC’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent for reunification must not be ignored. The ever increasing number of missiles 










































VI.  PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 At one time, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was the backbone of the PRC’s 
defense strategy. The PRC has long believed that it could effectively fight an enemy on 
the mainland by trading the space of China’s vast terrain for time in order to defeat 
enemy forces. The PLA was trained to allow enemy forces to move deep into China and, 
once enemy forces had both its troops and logistic support well within Chinese territory, 
the PLA would then attack. The PRC has maintained this defense strategy and relied on a 
massive infantry force even as the world’s militaries changed with modern technology. 
Due to ineffective reforms and an inability to adapt, the PLA grew to 4 million troops, 
but in the process became a relatively ineffective fight force.  
Between 1950 and 1979, the PLA fought the United States, India, the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam in various actions. In each instance, the PLA suffered a large number 
of casualties due to a lack of effective infantry tactics and poor equipment issued to its 
soldiers. While recognizing these losses, the PLA continuously failed to learn from its 
experiences and implement effective reforms. In 1985, with these failures in mind, Deng 
Xiaoping called for a reduction in manpower to release funds towards modernization for 
each service. Although the PLA has been reduced to nearly the 1.6 million army troops, 
the PLA has not received the same commitment to modernization as the other branches. 
The significant amounts of foreign, particularly Russian, military acquisitions received 
for modernization have not gone to the army.170 This lack of army modernization was 
further complicated by perceptions about the use of air power during the Persian Gulf 
War and the Kosovo campaign. During its study of these conflicts, the PRC foresaw a 
lesser need for large, highly immobile infantry units to defend the mainland. The PRC no 
longer wanted to fight a people’s war, but wanted to prepare for limited, local wars with 
high-tech equipment. PRC studies prompted the formation of rapid reaction and special 
forces units in its army to the neglect of other units in the army. However, through recent 
studies of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the PRC is once again showing an interest 
                                                 




in on modernizing its infantry, with an emphasis on its mechanized units. This effort can 
help its army units to move with the speed and mobility of a U.S. armored or infantry 
division. 
 Despite any advance in modernization the PLA may achieve, without proper 
amphibious or transport capabilities, the army’s efforts are purely superficial against 
Taiwan. As noted in previous chapters, the PRC currently lacks the ability to transport an 
adequate number of soldiers and equipment to successfully invade Taiwan. The PRC will 
not acquire these capabilities for at least the next twenty years, if not more. To compound 
its modernization problems, the army has received little support from the CMC to 
modernize. However, given the modern equipment the PLA does receive is only 
supplying its units in the southeast in preparation for future operations against Taiwan.171 
With the PRC striving for the capability to transport its troops to the battlefield, it is 
important to understand the efforts of the PRC in modernizing its ground forces.    
 This chapter discusses the modernization of the PLA’s infantry, armor, artillery 
and aviation units and its possible effects on an assault on Taiwan. Also, the chapter 
discusses the doctrinal and personnel changes the PLA is pursuing in order to keep step 
with fast-paced, highly fluid combat environment. 
B. INFANTRY  
The PRC divides the mainland into seven Military Regions (MR) and assigns 
PLA units to each MR for its defense. Currently, the PLA divides its infantry forces into 
two groups, both of which have a distinctively differently mission while protecting the 
MRs. These two groups are border defense and internal security forces and high priority, 
mobile units.172 These units are different in training and in the type of equipment issued 
to their respective soldiers. Due to the training discrepancies among these PLA units, the 
level of modernization in the two groups is vastly different. However, the PRC has 
committed a significant number of infantry troops with a respectable amount of quality 
training to the southeast of China.  
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This emphasis of a trained infantry force, along with a significant number of modern 
cruise missiles, in the southeast shows the emphasis the PRC has on securing its borders 
and preparing for action against Taiwan using infantry forces. 
With the likelihood of a massive ground campaign or amphibious assault 
occurring on mainland China considered highly unlikely, the PRC has equipped its 
border troops with older equipment and inadequate personnel. The PRC believes modern 
equipment should only go to those PLA troops that are trained and qualified to operate 
it.173 The PLA wants to ensure it has trained personnel to operate the equipment due to a 
lack of foreign acquisitions dedicated solely for the army. PLA border units are poorly 
trained, with the exception of Taiwan Strait border units. They show little motivation and 
are equipped with 1950s weaponry. Although the PRC is downsizing its border units to 
allow for better training and equipment for Taiwan Strait border units, the funds released 
are continuously going to advanced units and not border defense. Without augmenting 
the PRC’s border units, particularly those across from Taiwan, a serious weakness is 
emerging in Chinese defense.  
The major effort behind the PLA’s infantry modernization is transforming its 
forces into group armies capable of launching highly mobile and technologically 
advanced campaigns. However, these reforms have severely limited the PLA’s capability 
to transform into cohesive group armies due to the significance placed on special units by 
the CMC.174 The PLA has focused on removing large infantry forces incapable of 
providing a rapid response to crises throughout China. To aid in this effort, the PRC has 
reduced its manpower and more specifically designated infantry units as rapid response 
capable. While this seems a sound plan, the PLA’s efforts have only aided smaller units 
while its regular infantry has been neglected.  
The PLA has divided its infantry forces into 20 group armies, 40 maneuver 
divisions and 40 maneuver brigades with, according to the Department of Defense, a 
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dozen divisions and several brigades designated as rapid reaction, or Fist, units.175 These 
FIST units are regular infantry forces being trained for rapid deployment and highly 
mobile warfare. The first successful experiment of these Fist units took place in the South 
China Sea. A PLA Fist unit, most likely consisting of a small number of troops with the 
PLA’s poor amphibious capability, simulated the seizure of a number of small islands in 
the area.176 While deemed successful, this operation did not demonstrate a true rapid 
reaction capability. The larger goal of the PRC is to designate one Fist unit in each of its 
group armies, and at the very least one in each of the seven MRs. The PRC hopes that 
these units will be capable of traveling to designated areas to engage an enemy force or 
quell an internal security matter. However, due to the lack of dedicated training for these 
units, the probability of the PLA actually achieving its goal is highly unlikely.  
Another attempt to utilize infantry forces more effectively is through special 
operation forces (SOF). The perceived use of SOF by U.S. and coalition forces during the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq impressed Beijing. During both conflicts, SOF were 
assigned to secure or destroy different C4I assets and logistical objectives in order to 
prepare for the arrival of follow-on units. According to the Department of Defense, the 
PLA intends to use SOF to carry out missions deemed time-critical as part of an 
expanded ground campaign. The PRC will dedicate its SOF to conduct surveillance, 
capture or destroy airfields and ports, destroy IADS and conduct psychological 
operations intended to deceive Taiwan and deny them intelligence information.177 The 
PLA has reportedly conducted successful SOF operations that validate the training of this 
special mission force, but like the Fist units, no undeniable demonstration of their ability 
has arisen. Also, due to a lack of comprehensive joint training between SOF and the 
PLA’s regular infantry, the two groups do not work well together in the field. This lack of 
training makes it likely that any PRC assault on Taiwan in the near future could end in 
disaster.   
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In an effort to make its infantry more mechanized, the PRC has purchased from 
Russia the BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV).178 This IFV can allow infantry units 
to maintain formation with armored units and allow smaller units to move into battle 
quicker. The BMP-3 can also allow PLA soldiers to enter into combat with vehicles 
equipped with a heavy machine gun and laser guided anti-tank missiles. The PLA does 
not equip either weapon in its infantry units and each can be able to provide suppressive 
fire for advancing infantry and the capability to disable or destroy an enemy tank without 
CAS or a friendly armor asset. However, due to the small number of IFV bought from 
Russia--reportedly 200--the PLA will probably equip Fist or SOF with the BMP-3 but not 
the regular infantry.179 Only equipping these specialized units would defeat the PLA’s 
purpose of trying to form a more mechanized infantry force. The PLA also intends to 




 The PLA’s armored units consist of approximately 8300 main battle tanks (MBT) 
of varied design and operability. The backbone of these armored units is the Type-59 
MBT, approximately 6000 of which are in the PLA’s inventory.181 The PRC has 
produced numerous variants of the Type-59 MBT and has deployed these tanks 
throughout its armored units. The PRC produced so many Type-59 MBTs that Beijing 
sold the tanks to various nations, including Iraq. The PRC’s analysis of the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War showed how obsolete this tank was in modern combat. The speed, agility and 
firepower of the U.S. M1A1 Abrams tank divisions completely decimated the Iraqi 
armored divisions using the Type-59 MBT. This realization forced the PRC to develop a 
more modern tank and begin modifications of its existing tanks. Many of the Type-59 
MBTs were retrofitted with the long-range 105-mm main gun, laser range finders and 
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anti-aircraft guns to aid in this effort.182 However, the modifications still do not make the 
Type-59 a match for either the ROC M-60 or U.S. Abrams MBTs. 
2. Type-80 and Type-85 
 The most modern tanks in the PLA inventory are the Type-80 and Type-85 
MBTs. The PRC purchased 200 of these MBTs in 1993 from Russia and have distributed 
them to FIST units.183 More importantly, the Fist units are located in southeast China, in 
preparation against Taiwan. These MBTs boast better armored protection, a more 
advanced main gun, 125-mm, additional space for the tank crew and ammunition and 
provide a laser guided anti-tank missile capability. These tanks are designed to defeat the 
120 former U.S. M60 MBTs the ROC uses in its armored units. The Type-85 compares to 
the Russian T-72 MBT in design, performance and weight, but with an advanced fire 
control system onboard, it is a deadlier weapon. Taking note of U.S. MBT doctrine, the 
PLA developed a fire control system that allows the Type-85 to engage targets while still 
moving.184 However, the PLA does not train with these new capabilities due to a lack of 
proper deployment in its armored units. 
3. Type-90 and Type-98   
The PLA is developing two MBTs based on indigenous technology that could 
rival the U.S. M1A1 Abrams tank. These MBTs are the Type-90 and Type-98. The Type-
90 was unveiled in 1991 and is an improvement over the older Type-85 MBT. The PLA 
designed the Type-90 to be more mobile than its previous tanks. It is modeled with a 
stronger hull construction for better armor protection and is designed to use advanced 
anti-tank munitions, such as high explosive anti-tank rounds, high explosive 
fragmentation rounds and armor piercing sabot rounds in each tank produced. This is 
unlike previous tanks, only a few of which could fire more advanced munitions. The 
Type-98 is a newer variant of the Type-90 and expands upon the improvements of its 
predecessor. The Type-98 is designed for more advanced combat with an advanced fire 
control system and a larger 125-mm gun. The Type-98 is the first PLA tank equipped 
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with an all-weather sight and computer control panel from its conception.185 The 
Department of Defense expects the number of Type-90s and Type-98s produced to reach 
1500 and deployable throughout the PLA by 2005.186  
D. ARTILLERY 
 The PLA has always used artillery as the main proponent for launching ground 
campaigns. Since the PLA is modernizing to fight advanced land, air and sea battles, the 
PLA wants to transform its artillery capability to fight in a modern battlefield. In an 
attempt to modernize its artillery, as well as continue to operate with past doctrine, the 
PLA is modernizing its artillery units with newer and more mobile equipment.187 By 
maintaining its artillery units, the PRC still has effective combat tools, and maintains 
links to past doctrine. 
In the past, the PLA needed to transport its artillery via rail or by tow. The 
majority of the PLA’s conventional artillery systems are no longer towed due to the time 
wasted in such an effort. However, towed systems are still widely utilized by units not 
equipped with newer artillery systems, particularly those in the west. The PLA has 
studied the U.S. Army’s mobile artillery and placed much of its heavier guns on tracked 
vehicles and tanks. The PLA utilizes two types of these guns: 155-mm and 203-mm self-
propelled howitzers (SPH). Both SPH systems are comparable to U.S. and Western 
artillery systems, but neither is widely deployed throughout the PLA.188 This is due to the 
PLA’s poor infrastructure, but the PLA is making strides to provide each region with the 
SPHs. If the PLA were able to produce a significant amount of these guns, they could be 
deployed in operations on Taiwan. However, PLA forces would need to transport these 
heavy guns across the Taiwan Strait and then deploy them on Taiwan to be useful for 
infantry forces.  
The main improvement to the PLA’s artillery units is the deployment of a 
multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). In its analysis of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 
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PLA saw the significant advantage that an accurate rocket barrage gave U.S. and 
coalition forces as forces moved forward into battle. By engaging the enemy with the 
MLRS, the U.S. and coalition forces suppressed Iraqi units concerned with the incoming 
barrages and then moved armored and mechanized units into battle before the Iraqis 
knew those forces were in the area. Following this example, the PRC would like to utilize 
this capability against Taiwan. A MLRS would allow the PLA to engage ROC targets at 
long ranges, use multiple barrages, and attack with great accuracy. The Russian 
government has reportedly sold the PRC a Splav Smerch MLRS with anti-armor 
munitions, mines and large warheads.189 This system would be used to disperse ROC 
forces along the beachhead as PLA forces try to move ashore. The PRC is also working 
to augment its technology by developing its own MLRS, but the research is on-going.190 
E. DOCTRINE AND PERSONNEL 
 As with the other services, the PLA is pursuing a change of doctrine and 
personnel in order to prepare for the future of combat. The PLA understands that its army 
cannot move against Taiwan unless significant changes are implemented. The PLA is 
modifying its training to conduct joint operations among services, striving to maintain 
higher educational standards for its officer corps and working to establish a group of non-
commissioned officers (NCO) to strengthen leadership within the ranks and striving for 
better command and control (C2) operability during ground campaigns.  
1. Joint Operability 
 For more efficient military operations and better cooperation between services, 
the branches of the U.S. military are striving to work jointly in combat operations. 
Recognizing that this is the future of effective combat operations, the PLA has taken up 
this effort. However, as the U.S. military knows, operating in a joint combat environment 
takes more than forces working together to become an effective weapon in combat. In 
past chapters, examples were provided on the successes and failures of the PLA joint 
operations. One problem the PLA has taken up is joint logistics. In 1999, the PLA began 
an effort to integrate the logistics of all its combat units. Like the U.S. military, by 
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combining the logistics of all the services, the PLA would be able to lessen costs and put 
forth more money towards modernization. The PLA has experimented in a variety of 
ways to manage the logistics of joint operations, but most have not succeeded.191 The 
PLA’s ability to control its logistics will prove to be a vital factor in the success of joint 
operations against Taiwan. Without supplies to equip the services in combat, 
compounded by the PLA not operating on its own territory, the PLA could be rendered 
useless. 
2. Education / NCO 
 As the U.S. military understood after the Vietnam War, relying on dedicated 
professional soldiers, forced the costs of a trained military to rise dramatically.192 
However, these rising costs allow for more varied training and better education for its 
leaders. To raise the education level of its officers, the PLA is sending its officer corps 
through various professional and college courses in an effort to provide them with more 
experience. The establishment of a National Defense University and several other 
universities like it has helped train PLA officers to become more prepared for varied 
assignments and possess the educational backgrounds necessary to succeed in those new 
assignments. For all of its officers, both current and those commissioned in the future, the 
PLA has set the goal of having its officers earning a college degree by 2005. In another 
effort to raise the education level, the PRC is implementing an officer-recruiting program 
at universities throughout China in order to train students before they join the PLA.193 
Both of these initiatives will allow for the improvement of the PLA’s officer corps, but 
the tangible results may not show for some time. 
 The second method the PLA has chosen to build up its core leadership was to 
establish a NCO corps in early 1990s. Due to its new preference not to rely on conscripts, 
the PLA has awarded those who chose to stay in the PLA by providing them with higher 
rank and pay.194 Those who chose to stay were selected as NCOs and placed throughout 
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various units in the PLA. At first, the NCOs were slowly put into leadership positions in 
the PLA to ensure that there was a core of leadership throughout the services. Throughout 
this process, the PRC began to decrease initial tours of duty for its conscripts and 
lengthened the contracts for those who chose to become NCOs. The PLA is still 
experimenting with expanding the role of NCOs due to mixed early results. However, if 
the PLA continues on this path, it should see positive results in its units. 
3. Command and Control 
 The future of the PLA’s command and control (C2) is based on the two preceding 
factors. As with the other services, the C2 capability of the PLA is minimal. Along with 
the lack of capabilities to gather early reconnaissance and intelligence information, the 
PLA also needs to ensure the proper implementation of its officers and NCOs into the C2 
process. Junior officers and NCOs will provide commanders with proper on-scene 
leadership and information. Training them to report information properly will make C2 
more efficient and provide more beneficial information to PLA commanders. However, 
the ability to properly utilize C2 resides not only with on-scene commanders, but also 
with a headquarters far away from operations. This further complicates the PLA’s C2 
situation due to a lack of adequate communication equipment.195 The use of antiquated 
communication equipment in the majority of PLA units limits the range a PLA infantry 
unit can travel from headquarters and means that time-sensitive information must be 
passed over open airwaves. Without proper equipment and procedures, the PLA’s C2 
capability is minimal, if not useless, in combat against Taiwan. 
F. SUMMARY 
 The PRC will continue to de-emphasize the army until it believes it has achieved 
an adequate level of modernization comparable to the other services, particularly the 
PLAAF. As noted earlier, unless the PRC can achieve a greater transport and amphibious 
capability than it currently possesses, the army’s modernization is purely superficial for 
operations against Taiwan. Although regular infantry still remains the predominant force 
in ground operations, the PLA is training Fist and SOF units for attacks against Taiwan’s 
                                                 




military infrastructure. However, these units have not received the necessary training that 
would allow them to carry out their mission.  
While the PLA is modifying existing tanks and building newer ones with 
advanced fire control systems, the number of adequate tanks capable of a successful 
engagement against ROC forces is minimal. The PLA has lofty plans to deploy the 
advanced Type-90 and Type-98 MBTs--those capable of successfully engaging a U.S. 
Abrams--but the number projected is not enough for a successful assault on Taiwan, 
particularly if U.S. forces provide the ROC with support.  
The only successes the PLA has achieved are in its initiatives towards officers and 
non-commissioned officers. By building up its core leadership with education, the PLA is 
providing itself with the opportunity to utilize trained leaders during combat. If the PLA 
were able to equip its field leaders with newer communication equipment, the PLA would 
be able to conduct command and control more effectively over its army units. However, 
the army’s overall modernization is far too weak to provide the PRC with a mobile, 
technologically advanced force. While the PLA’s 1.6 million troops are still a massive 
power, without the capabilities to control, move, defend and fight with this force, the 











































VII.  PLA OPTIONS AND WEAPONS FOR THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
A.  BACKGROUND 
 The PRC would like nothing more than reunification with Taiwan. In its white 
papers, the PRC discusses peaceful reunification, but it also reserves the right to use force 
against Taiwan to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.196 A direct 
assault on Taiwan has little chance of success, but many analysts, both in the PRC and 
the United States still dispute the possibility of such an invasion. Historical evidence 
suggests that the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid if the PRC pursues military 
action. PRC military planners are confounded by this problem because Beijing wants 
reunification but does not want to contend with Washington to achieve it. Several times 
in the past fifty years, the PRC witnessed U.S. carrier battle groups patrol the Taiwan 
Strait to deter its forces from taking action against Taiwan. Chinese analysts believe that 
the patrols of U.S. forces in the Taiwan Strait and the increased presence of U.S. forces in 
the region not only create a de facto military alliance with Taiwan, but the beginnings of 
a containment of China.197 Because of these beliefs, the PRC is devising ways to defeat 
its perceived threats and achieve the goal of reunification. 
 Based on analysis of U.S. forces in combat, the PRC recognizes that the United 
States may bring its advanced military might to aid Taiwan. To stop the United States, 
the PLA is developing ways to exploit U.S. reliance on technology and use it against 
Washington. Through detailed analysis of U.S. military campaigns in the Middle East 
and the Balkans, the PLA came to the conclusion that the United States relies heavily on 
its satellites, GPS navigation, precision weapons for engagements and intelligence 
information for strikes against its enemy’s C2. For future operations against Taiwan, the 
PRC recognizes the PLA cannot defeat the U.S. military if it comes to Taiwan’s aid and 
must resort to asymmetric means in order to fight it. The PRC is developing technology 
to deny C2 information simultaneously to both on-scene military commanders and 
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Washington when operations against Taiwan are underway. These asymmetric 
developments are the backbone to a successful PRC operation against the United States 
and the ROC in the Taiwan Strait. 
This chapter discusses the possibilities of an amphibious assault and a naval 
blockade on Taiwan. Both scenarios present different options for the PRC and are 
important to understand in order to project future PRC intentions. Also, the chapter 
discusses the asymmetric technology the PRC is attempting to exploit in order to defeat 
possible intervention by the United States. 
B. AGGRESSIVE REUNIFICATION 
 There are two scenarios most often debated for an aggressive reunification with 
Taiwan; an amphibious assault, and a naval blockade. Both scenarios have advantages 
and disadvantages that can affect the PRC’s political and strategic prospects and their 
success is dependent on the completion level of PLA modernization. If the PRC attempts 
either option in the near future, both options may fail and the PRC might suffer 
international condemnation. However, in twenty years, the PRC may achieve its goals for 
PLA modernization and then the failure of an aggressive reunification would not be as 
certain.  
1. Amphibious Assault 
 An amphibious assault on Taiwan is highly unlikely. Several PRC military factors 
need to be in place in order for Beijing to successfully invade Taiwan. Also, the terrain of 
Taiwan itself, not to mention the ROC forces defending its territory, provides a natural 
defense against approaching PLA forces. As noted earlier, the PRC currently does not 
possess the amphibious capability to transport the number of PLA soldiers necessary for 
a successful invasion of Taiwan. Also, the PLA does not possess the airlift capability to 
transport enough of its airborne units. Without its airborne units, the PRC would not be 
able to carry out preliminary strikes against ROC defenses and C2 centers. However, this 
may change in next twenty years, depending on China’s commitment to building an 
amphibious fleet. One possible solution is the PLA’s use of thousands of small boats 
using GPS systems and attempting a synchronized approach to Taiwan’s coast.198 
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However, this solution seems highly unlikely because of the training and preparation 
needed to make such an operation successful. Also, the thousands of boats necessary to 
conduct such an operation would provide Taiwan with ample warning of an attack. While 
these boats are transiting the Taiwan Strait, ROC radars would be able to detect them. 
Despite the current lack of transport capability, PRC forces necessary for an invasion 
need to be discussed.   
For a better chance of success, an amphibious assault will need to take place as a 
phased operation. The PLA’s first goal would be to secure the ROC-controlled islands: 
the Pescadores, Kinmen and Matsu Islands. However, this will not be an easy task for the 
PLA. The ROC currently maintains 5 divisions on these islands dedicated to security 
against the PRC.199 These troops continuously train in repelling island assaults, but they 
lack the quantitative advantage that the PLA could bring against these few divisions. If 
the PLA were able to secure the islands, it could establish a base of operations closer to 
Taiwan and capture or kill the 5 ROC divisions capable of supporting ROC forces for the 
later assault of Taiwan.200  
In an effort to gain control of these islands, the PLA is placing a high priority on 
camouflage and deceptive tactics with its units. The PRC’s intent is to create ambiguity 
about its actual intentions and force the ROC to misallocate resources throughout Taiwan 
in preparation for any attack.201 By this tactic, PLA forces may be able to act quickly 
enough to gain control of the surrounding islands and then start moving its forces against 
Taiwan. 
A phased operation, however, presents several operational problems for the PLA. 
First, an attack against ROC forces is a time-sensitive matter. The longer it takes the PLA 
to reach Taiwan, the more time the ROC has to prepare for the attack and begin 
diplomatic talks with the international community to request help. Second, if the PLA is 
not able to quickly defeat the 5 ROC divisions and takes heavy casualties, the initiative of 
an invasion will be lost. The ROC could provide support for its forces on the islands and 
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possibly push the PLA off the islands. If this were to happen, the PLA would not only 
have failed to meet its objectives, but would also have suffered a loss of face.  
For Beijing to be successful, a tight operational timeline would need to be met. 
Before moving onto Taiwan, the PLA would need to secure the islands, establish its 
logistical base, and begin moving forces to Taiwan within a 72-hour time period. If any 
later, the ROC could adequately prepare its defenses on Taiwan and repel an initial PLA 
assault. Also, a U.S. military presence could arrive from Japan in that time and provide 
Taiwan with support. Due to the intense pressure to accomplish these goals, PLA 
commanders must move their forces quickly. However, since an invasion force will 
consist of Fist units as well as regular infantry, the likelihood of moving these forces 
quickly is small. Due to the lack of mechanized equipment for its regular infantry and of 
joint training between these units, the PLA might not be able to meet the necessary 
timeline. 
 As its invasion force transits the Taiwan Strait, the PRC will need to ensure it has 
the air and naval assets available to defend against ROC forces. As noted earlier, severe 
doctrinal issues limit the PLA’s ability to defend its invasion force at sea. First, the 
majority of PLA pilots, either in the navy or air force, do not conduct over-water flights. 
This hinders the PLA’s ability to defend against ROC F-16s patrolling the Taiwan Strait. 
Second, the inability for air and naval assets to work jointly, particularly away from a 
PRC homeport, presents the possibility for friendly fire engagements as the PLA engages 
ROC aircraft. Third, the PLA air services do not train well with live ammunition. 
Without proper protection, PLA invasion forces could be decimated before they reach 
Taiwan. 
 Prior to PLA troops coming ashore, the PLA will need to deal with the risks 
involved with Taiwan’s terrain. First, the weather surrounding Taiwan is extremely 
volatile and unpredictable. Stormy conditions and limited visibility are important factors 
in the PLA’s planning. During the 1995-1996 military exercises, a typhoon formed and 
forced the PLA ships and aircraft operating to return to the mainland. Second, Taiwan’s 
coast ensures shipping lanes are not deep enough for many ships and boats except in a 




with mud flats that extend two to five miles out to sea.202 These flats would cause serious 
grounding problems for incoming landing craft as they approached Taiwan. Finally, the 
geography of Taiwan provides ROC forces with another natural defense. Depending on 
which coast the PLA chooses to assault, the invasion force would either have to contend 
with scaling mountains or contend with an option of not landing enough troops due to the 
lack of adequate LZs.203 In the amount of time the PLA may need to offload its invasion 
force and establish its logistical base on Taiwan, ROC forces could create a bottleneck 
effect and inflict a large number of casualties on the PLA. This initial fighting could force 
the PLA to waste time it could not afford (See Figure 3). 
If the PLA were able to meet its timeline and gain naval and air superiority over 
Taiwan, the PLA could begin a battle of attrition against ROC forces. Taiwan has roughly 
2 million troops consisting of 21 active divisions (including the 5 divisions on the ROC 
controlled islands), 7 reserve divisions, 2 armored and mechanized divisions and 1 
marine division deployed throughout Taiwan for internal defense.204 The PLA would 
need to land enough troops, nearly 1 million, on Taiwan before heading inland. As the 
PLA marched through Taiwan, the ROC, due to its smaller numbers, can engage PLA 
forces in ambushes and numerous hit-and-run battles. If the PLA were victorious, 
whether destroying or forcing the ROC’s surrender, the conflict would cause large 
amounts of civilian dead, the destruction of Taiwan’s infrastructure and the end to 
Taiwan’s economic strength. As with Hong Kong, Beijing wants to harness the economic 
prosperity that Taiwan has displayed and incorporate it for its own economic growth. The 
loss of regional and economic stability would not only affect China, but all of the 
countries in Asia.205 The PRC wants to continue its economic growth, but with the 
certain loss of economic ties with the United States and Japan, and possibly with other 
nations, this would ensure an end to China’s economic prosperity. For this reason alone, 
an invasion of Taiwan is not viable for the PRC. 
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Figure 3.   Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/taiwan-geo.htm 
 
 2. Naval Blockade  
 A naval blockade of Taiwan is the most likely scenario for aggressive 
reunification with the PRC. A blockade can be established quickly, cheaply and 
efficiently and, if Taiwan capitulates, the infrastructure of Taiwan would remain intact. 
The ROC understands that this is the most plausible scenario for the PRC and is 
preparing its own contingency plans to counter such a blockade. 
If Taiwan does not capitulate fast enough, a naval blockade could be the first part 
of an amphibious assault. However, the timeframe the PRC could sustain operations in 
the Taiwan Strait, after achieving its modernization goals, is longer than the ROC could 
keep its citizens fed with the resources available. The blockade would drain ROC 
resources, particularly oil, and ensure a ROC inability to stage an effective counterattack. 
In 1999, an oil reserve on Taiwan fell from 120 days to only 18 days and considerably 
limits the ROC military response capability.206  
To establish the blockade, the PRC could follow the example of the U.S. naval 
quarantine around Cuba in 1962. Before its ships were in place, the PRC could announce 
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that it was blockading Taiwan and ROC-controlled islands.207 After this announcement, 
the terms of the blockade would be established for the international community to avoid 
damage to shipping. A blockade provides numerous legal ambiguities for the PRC. First, 
a naval quarantine, instead of a blockade, would be declared against Taiwan. The PRC 
ships could legally be allowed to quarantine Taiwan and ROC-controlled territories 
without a declaring a state of war. However, under international law, an attack on PRC 
ships or aircraft enforcing the quarantine could be considered an act of war against 
China.208 This ambiguity could force the international community to use diplomatic 
means to stop the PRC’s quarantine. However, in the time it would take to act on behalf 
of Taiwan, the PRC might have forced Taiwan’s capitulation. 
 The forces involved in quarantine could conduct three operations. First, they 
would establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Without air superiority, PLAN 
ships would be subject to air attacks from ROC forces. Second, PRC forces would 
conduct MIW in the Taiwan Strait to deter U.S. and commercial shipping. The PRC 
would hope that once the waters around Taiwan have been mined, foreign insurance 
companies, fearing damages to its ships, would raise insurance prices and force ships 
heading toward Taiwan to turn around. As mentioned earlier, Taiwan’s minesweeping 
capability is extremely limited.209 Finally, the PRC could board and divert any 
commercial ships headed toward Taiwan to ensure supplies do not arrive. The lack of 
supplies would force Taiwan to capitulate quickly or allow its citizens to suffer from 
possible starvation. Also, if Taiwan tries to run the quarantine, there is a risk of escalating 
to a full-scale war between the ROC and the PRC.210 If the quarantine escalates to war, 
then the outcome would become what neither the PRC nor Taiwan would want. 
 The biggest disadvantage of a naval quarantine is the time the PRC needs to 
establish and maintain it to allow success. The mines necessary for a blockade would 
need to be deployed quickly and covertly in order to prevent ROC assets from interfering 
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with PRC efforts. Once complete, the PRC would need to ensure it deters ROC warships 
and foreign freighters from interfering with the quarantine. If too many ROC or foreign 
warships were damaged or sunk, Washington could be forced to interfere and will present 
a direct threat to the quarantine. Finally, the longer the ROC took to capitulate, the longer 
the international community might have to act on behalf of Taiwan.211  
International pressure may bring either aid to Taiwan or force a confrontation 
with PRC forces. Despite the disadvantages of a naval blockade, this is the PRC’s best 
option for forcing reunification. The sheer number of PLA aircraft and warships provides 
the PRC an advantage over Taiwan. Also, the PRC efforts at military modernization can 
eventually negate the qualitative advantage ROC forces currently possess. However, if 
the PRC cannot find ways to defeat the United States, should it come to Taiwan’s aid, 
then Beijing might fail to reunify Taiwan.   
C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
 The PRC recognizes that the United States is heavily reliant on technology when 
it goes into battle. If Washington comes to Taiwan’s aid, its advanced military 
technology would be used to deter China. The PRC is developing options designed to 
exploit the U.S. military’s reliance on technology in a variety of ways. One such option is 
the PRC’s pursuit of the active use of information operations (IO). The PRC is designing 
its IO to disrupt U.S. logistics and communications, exploit the weaknesses of U.S. 
technology and develop an effective defense against U.S. military power.212 The 
development of PRC IO came from its study of U.S. and coalition actions in the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. During the course of the war, U.S. and coalition forces denied 
Baghdad its ability to gather intelligence and control its troops by attacking Iraqi 
intelligence and communication centers. U.S. and coalition forces targeted Iraqi C2 sites 
to destroy intelligence centers and force individual Iraqi units to surrender from a lack of 
a centralized command authority. While the United States used IO throughout the Persian 
Gulf War, the PRC intends to use IO only during the initial phases of combat in hopes to 
deter an escalation. The PRC realizes that once Washington is committed to military 
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action it will adapt to whatever IO the PRC is conducting.213 Due to its inability to stop a 
stronger force, the PRC is working to defeat the United States through asymmetrical 
means, especially through the use of IO. The PRC is developing two types of IO: 1) 
electronic warfare (EW) and 2) computer-network attacks (CNA). 
1. Electronic Warfare 
 The PRC’s EW capability stems from the reverse engineering of Western 
technology, the purchase of foreign--particularly Russian--systems and indigenous 
developments.214 The use of EW in the Taiwan Strait could allow it to gain the initiative 
in the early days of any U.S. response. The PRC could deny the United States intelligence 
information by jamming its electronic equipment, using electronic deception to relay 
false information, and deny the United States the ability to counter these attacks through 
the hardening of its electronic facilities and various ECMs employed on PLA units.215 
The Department of Defense believes that the PRC will also employ EW in the Taiwan 
Strait through the use of UAVs. UAVs would be employed to patrol designated areas and 
intercept and find electronic signals from both U.S. and ROC forces. Then, through the 
use of radio and radar-jamming equipment, the PRC would disrupt the electronic 
equipment in order to covertly move its forces and cause confusion among both U.S. and 
ROC C2.216 Current capabilities, to locate and counter UAVs are limited due to their 
small radar reflective signature. 
 The PRC is also developing EW capabilities for use from the mainland. The PRC 
recognizes that EW assets aboard ships and aircraft, while extremely effective, are 
vulnerable to eventual counterattack. From its studies of the Kosovo Campaign, the PRC 
took note of NATO aircraft emitting radar and radio jamming pulses to disrupt Serbian 
communication systems. However, when Serbian forces began hiding its C2 sites in 
caves and large population areas, NATO aircraft were unable to locate the Serbian sites 
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and disrupt communications.217 The PRC is developing its land-based EW capability to 
be mobile and to possess the range necessary to affect U.S. and ROC forces at sea. Also, 
the PRC is increasing its use of camouflage and concealment for radars and electronic 
equipment in order to deny U.S. satellites targeting information.218 Finally, the PRC is 
devoting resources to countering U.S. attacks on its systems. With the installation of fiber 
optic cable and tougher encryption programs, the PRC has a better opportunity to deny 
outside interference from the United States. With these capabilities, the PRC could 
effectively negate the advantage the United States has relied on in previous conflicts. 
While effective, EW has too much vulnerability to use alone against U.S. and 
ROC forces. The United States and ROC have numerous ECMs in place to defeat an 
electronic attack from the PRC. In order for an electronic attack to be successful, the PRC 
would also need to employ PGMs against U.S. military targets equipped with an ECM 
capability. By striking with PGMs, the PRC could effectively destroy or blind for a short 
time intelligence gathering capabilities, radars and other early warning systems.219 
However, the use of PGMs will no doubt cause a loss of life and the destruction of 
military assets in the area. By using PGMs, the PRC is inviting Washington to escalate 
the conflict and strike PRC forces in both the Taiwan Strait and the mainland. The United 
States could deploy more forces to the area in an effort to defeat PRC attacks and ensure 
no further attacks on Taiwan. This is not the route the PRC wants for reunification. 
2. Computer-Network Attacks 
 The use of computers by the U.S. military gives it a great advantage in combat. 
The United States recognizes that its computer and information systems are vulnerable to 
attack, and assured protection against attacks is still a long into the future.220 The use of 
computers as an offensive tool is one the PRC’s main focuses in preparation for combat 
against the United States. The PRC intends to use CNA to instill chaos and pandemonium 
in both Taiwan and the United States by turning off power grids and affecting 
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communication and financial networks in an effort to force a delay in action by both 
governments. By taking these measures, the PRC hopes that the United States and 
Taiwan would be too stunned to act against the PRC. Also, Beijing hopes that the ROC 
will submit to public outcries over the lack of electricity and money and capitulate 
quickly.221  
According to the Cox Report, the PRC has obtained high performance computers 
capable of collecting, processing and analyzing intelligence and dedicated to denying the 
United States its own intelligence gathering capabilities.222 The PRC is focusing on two 
methods to conduct CNA against the United States. These two attacks are computer 
viruses and through the use of the internet.   
a. Computer Viruses 
 The PRC seeks to use computer viruses as an offensive tool against 
Taiwan and the United States.223 Because of the recent string of worldwide computer 
viruses, the PRC is aware of the impact a computer virus can have on civilian, as well as 
military systems. The PRC also recognizes that it needs asymmetric means to defeat the 
United States and that a computer virus provides it with that possibility. Not only is a 
computer virus relatively easy to install, but deciphering the source’s identity is relatively 
long and difficult. Also, a computer virus can be deployed and activated through a variety 
of methods. The heavy use of electronics for civilian and military purposes by the United 
States could allow the PRC to install a hidden virus in U.S. computer systems, keep it 
dormant until deemed necessary. Then, through the use of electromagnetic waves, 
Beijing could initiate the virus.224  
The PRC calls the use of computer viruses against the United States 
“unrestricted warfare.” The PRC believes the United States and Taiwan will react to 
attacks on its financial markets with frustration and indecision about how to respond to 
the attack. The PRC is developing computer viruses capable of attacking U.S. financial 
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markets, as well as simultaneously attacking on power grids and communication 
networks.225 The 2003 power blackout that affected the northeastern United States is a 
perfect example of the possible potential effects of a computer virus against the United 
States. Although not caused by a computer virus, the blackout caused the chaos and 
pandemonium Beijing would hope for in its initial CNA. For twelve hours the majority of 
the northeast was without power, the U.S. stock market was down, questions arose over 
the security of U.S. power grids and communication networks were disabled. This event 
displays the potential a computer virus has to cripple the nation’s response capability. 
b. Internet 
 Growing technology and the use of the Internet throughout the world 
provides the PRC with another avenue to launch asymmetrical attacks on the United 
States. The PLA believes the U.S. Department of Defense to be too reliant on civilian 
networks and its unclassified military network, NIPRNET, and it intends to use this to its 
advantage. PLA analysts believe that the PRC could attack these sites anonymously and 
degrade the response capability of the United States.226 The PRC has already conducted 
attacks on U.S. websites using its Internet capabilities. In 1999, after the accidental 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy, the Chinese began to hack into U.S. and allied 
websites in retaliation. The PRC initiated the Internet attack by writing “down with the 
barbarians” on the U.S. Embassy in Beijing’s homepage. Also, the PRC reported the 
blackout of numerous U.S. political and military websites as well as nearly 1000 civilian 
and NATO websites.227 The PRC’s attention to the Internet provides it great possibilities 
to use during the initial operational phases against Taiwan and the United States. 
D. SPACE WEAPONS 
 In 2003, the PRC became the third nation in the world to send a man into space. 
This event not only has political ramifications, but military ones as well. Since 1985, the 
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PRC has made considerable effort to modernize in the three environments available to its 
forces: land, sea and air. With space now available, the PRC is modernizing in that fourth 
environment, as well.228 China’s venture into space can allow it to threaten U.S. satellites 
and limit the U.S. military’s access to intelligence information. Each satellite the PRC 
launches into space has one of two uses. PRC satellites are reportedly either used for 
intelligence gathering or potentially as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. 
1. Intelligence Gathering 
The PRC’s intelligence-gathering satellites are dedicated to developing 
meteorological, communications and surveillance systems for use against both the United 
States and Taiwan.229 Particularly, the PRC is striving to use its space satellites to track 
the movements of ROC and U.S. naval forces around Taiwan in order to make counter 
moves with its own military. The PRC’s ultimate goal for its satellites is to augment its 
C2 capability by obtaining real-time imaging data for its forces.230 Also, the PRC is 
developing a GPS system that cannot be controlled by the United States and will allow 
for more accurate deployment of its forces. In 2000, the PRC launched a satellite that was 
the first of a Chinese GPS system in space.231 As more PRC satellites are launched, its 
intelligence gathering capability might rival that of the United States.   
2. Active ASAT 
The PRC is also developing a space program designed for offensive strikes 
against U.S. satellites in space. The PRC is developing three types of ASAT technology: 
1) lasers; 2) direct ascent weapons; and 3) anti-satellite satellites. The Department of 
Defense believes that the PRC already possesses the capability to damage U.S. satellites 
using these capabilities.  
a. Lasers 
The PRC has ground-based lasers (GBL) capable of destroying the optical 
sensors of satellites and denying the United States the ability to fully utilize its satellites. 
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The PRC is using tracking devices to monitor the location and orbital track of U.S. 
satellites. Also, due to advanced technology, PRC lasers reportedly can engage satellites 
with less preparation time.232  
b. Direct Ascent 
Although Beijing currently does not possess the ability to destroy 
satellites, the Department of Defense cites examples of PRC R&D developing direct 
ascent ASAT systems that could be deployed between 2005 and 2010. This system could 
be launched directly from earth and used to target U.S. satellite systems. The Department 
of Defense cites Chinese scientific articles suggesting that the PRC should intensify 
research on direct ascent systems in order to destroy U.S. space systems and thus allow 
the PRC an ability to gain the initiative in battle.233  
c. Anti-satellite Satellites 
The final offensive ASAT capability in development is the use of anti-
satellite satellites. Such satellites could be deployed using one of three methods to destroy 
U.S. satellites. First, the satellites may contain 30 gram steel balls that would be released 
in the orbit to destroy the outer shell of U.S. satellites. Second, the satellites may come 
equipped with paint or powder to cover the optical sensors of U.S. satellites. Finally, the 
satellites might be deployed with jamming equipment to interrupt U.S. communication or 
GPS satellites transmissions.234 If the PRC were able to deny the United States its GPS 
capability while possessing its own, the PRC would have a tremendous advantage over 
the effective deployment of its forces.  
E. NEW CONCEPT WEAPONS235 
As the United States develops advanced weapons to fight its enemies, the PRC is 
mirroring this development in order to fight the United States. The PRC understands the 
advantages of using advanced weaponry against a superior enemy and has dedicated 
significant resources to deploying its own new weapons in the next twenty years.  
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1. Kinetic Energy  
 The Department of Defense believes the PLA is in the late stages of developing a 
kinetic energy weapon. The advantage of this weapon is that it would provide an 
unlimited number of rounds to destroy enemy targets, particularly combat aircraft, 
without providing a point of origin. The Department of Defense cites Chinese 
publications indicating that state the PLA hopes to deploy these weapons for its naval air 
defense. This indicates the PLA hopes to employ this weapon against the United States as 
it deploys ships and aircraft to aid Taiwan.  
2. Laser 
 The PRC has been researching the deployment of lasers since the 1960s and 
recognizes that lasers will be the weapons of choice for the 21st century.236 The PLA is 
focusing its laser efforts on anti-personnel, counter-PGM air defense and ASAT roles. 
The PLA is developing solid-state, free electron, x-ray, and other types of lasers for 
varied purposes. These lasers are designed to destroy U.S. and Taiwan weapons-- 
particularly tanks, infrastructure, electronics--and some are designed to make humans 
sick.237 Also, the PLA is developing numerous types of lasers for use on its MBTs. These 
systems can help designate combat targets more accurately and reduce collateral damage 
during combat. However, like the kinetic energy weapons, the ability to harness the 
energy for more weapons remains unclear. Although lasers are still in a conceptual phase, 
the Department of Defense expects the PRC to become the leading producer and exporter 
of lasers for military technology by 2020. 
3. Radiofrequency 
 The PRC has publicly indicated that radiofrequency (RF) weapons are needed to 
defeat its enemies, particularly the United States, in the future. RF weapons are 
sometimes called the “superstars” of warfare due to their conceptual use as an electronic 
jammers or ASAT tools.238 The PLA is developing high-powered RF weapons with help 
from foreign scientists and technology in an effort to destroy incoming missiles and 
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disrupt U.S. communications by targeting the electronics on those systems. The PLA is 
attempting to adapt this technology on missile warheads or aircraft bombs so that they 
can be brought into combat using a mobile launch platform. However, the ability to mass-
produce the amount of RF energy necessary to support such a mission remains unknown. 
Also, it is still unclear whether RF energy on a missile warhead would be more 
destructive than a conventional warhead. In addition, questions remain of the feasibility 
to harness RF energy. 
F. SUMMARY 
 The PRC strives for reunification with Taiwan. Publicly, the PRC wishes for 
peaceful reunification, but it reserves the right to use force against Taiwan if it calls for 
independence. The PLA is developing plans to coerce Taiwan’s reunification either 
through an amphibious assault or a naval blockade. An amphibious assault, once the 
PRC’s transport capability is augmented, can force the capitulation of Taiwan, but at a 
terrible cost to both Taiwan and the PRC. If the PRC conducts an all-out assault, 
Taiwan’s economic prosperity will cease to exist. The PRC will have to inflict a war of 
attrition to defeat ROC forces and the collateral damage to Taiwan’s infrastructure would 
be severe. However, a naval blockade presents the PRC with a tremendous opportunity. 
A naval blockade, dubbed a quarantine for legal ambiguity, would force a diplomatic 
approach to the crisis from the international community. As the international community 
used diplomacy to quell this crisis, the PRC’s blockade would force Taiwan to deplete its 
food supplies and oil reserves. With the ROC’s reserves only amounting to three weeks 
worth, Taiwan would need to decide quickly how to react to a blockade. In an effort to 
protect its citizens, the ROC would either have to fight or capitulate.  
94 
The PRC recognizes that if it uses aggressive action against the ROC, then the 
United States may come to its aid. The PRC also recognizes that it cannot defeat the U.S. 
military unless it resorts to asymmetric warfare and exploits the weaknesses of the U.S. 
reliance on technology. In particular, the PRC is developing information operations 
doctrine for use against the United States. Beijing’s goal is to deny Washington its ability 
to gather intelligence in order to carry out operations in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC has 
also proven its willingness to use computers for its own benefit in the hopes to cause 
chaos and panic in both the United States and Taiwan.  
 
 
The use of computer viruses and the Internet may allow China to affect America’s 
financial markets, communication networks and power grids without Washington even 
knowing it was the PRC who sent the attack.  
The PRC is not relying only on information operations to stop an U.S. response in 
Taiwan. The development of space technology is intended to damage or destroy U.S. 
satellites and deny Washington the ability to use its technology in combat. As it makes 
preparations against U.S. satellites, China is launching its own satellites into space that 
could provide the PLA with intelligence information on the movement of U.S. and ROC 
forces during conflict. Also, with the continued development of a Chinese GPS system, 
comparable to America’s, the PLA may soon have access to an information tool that was 
previously only a Western technology. Along with a new array of advanced weapons, the 








































VIII.  CONCLUSION 
A. PLAN 
The PRC seeks to operate a blue-water force and is no longer content with being 
limited to the littoral waters around China. The PRC has approached the PLAN 
modernization by decommissioning obsolete warships, retrofitting ships with advanced 
weapons systems and radars, developing an effective submarine fleet, and purchasing 
advanced naval platforms designed to sink U.S. warships. Many positive strides have 
been made to modernize the PLAN, but some crucial areas still remain untouched. 
The PLAN’s first major step toward operating a blue-water force was the 
purchase of 4 Sovremenny DDGs from Russia. These warships, specifically designed by 
the former Soviet Navy to sink U.S. aircraft carriers, would be used by the PLAN to deter 
U.S. aircraft carriers from entering the Taiwan Strait. The weapon systems onboard, 
particularly the 120nm Sunburn ASCM, makes it an effective weapon against a warship. 
However, the PRC purchased too few Sovremenny DDGs to defeat the quantitative and 
qualitative force both the United States and the ROC may have operating in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
 The PLAN’s continued development of an undersea warfare capability is one of 
its greatest strengths. The purchase of 4 Kilo class submarines allows the PLAN to 
operate submarines in the Taiwan Strait that are as quiet as a Los Angeles class 
submarine.239 Due to the lack of an adequate ASW capability in the area, the Kilos could 
potentially deter warships and commercial shipping from entering the Taiwan Strait. 
Also, since Kilos have the capability to conduct MIW, they can serve as efficient 
platforms to mine the Taiwan Strait and thereby provide support to a PRC naval blockade 
or quarantine. 
B. PLAAF 
 The PLAAF’s modernization is due to the significant role air power plays in 
modern combat. Studying the conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans, the PRC 
recognizes that a modern air fleet is necessary for future operations against Taiwan. The 
                                                 




PLAAF’s modernization is dedicated to establishing air superiority over the Taiwan 
Strait, conducting sustained flight operations and defeating the advanced combat aircraft 
maintained in the ROC’s Air Force.  
 The J-7 and J-8 airframes provide the PLAAF with limited avionics and air 
combat capability, but neither airframe is a match for the ROC F-16s. The PLAAF is 
currently deactivating many of its obsolete J-6s, the majority of PLAAF aircraft, and 
slowly replacing them with Russian Su-27 Flankers and Su-30 MKs. The PRC hopes 
these aircrafts will provide it with the air-to-air and all-weather capabilities it lacks in its 
current aircraft. While these aircraft are superior to anything in the ROC’s inventory, the 
PRC has only received a fraction of the aircraft promised by Russia. Also, without the 
capability to mass produce either of these aircraft and the continuous failure to 
indigenously produce its own version, the PLAAF cannot afford to lose many of its 
newer aircraft in training.240 With the PRC reluctant to fly its newer aircraft due to few 
replacements, PLAAF pilots will not likely achieve the efficiency to use these combat 
aircraft to their full potential.   
 The PLAAF is purchasing and developing a wide array of bombers and special 
mission aircraft for operations against Taiwan. Most of the bombers in the PLAAF 
inventory are from the 1950s, are obsolete, and lack any real capability to conduct attacks 
against Taiwan. However, the PRC hopes that through development of combat UAVs and 
the possible purchase of the Tu-22M Backfire from Russia, the PLAAF will gain the 
assets necessary to conduct bombing strikes against Taiwan. Also, with the development 
of an AWACs platform, the PRC hopes that this aircraft can provide C4ISR against both 
U.S. and ROC forces. 
 While making significant strides in modernizing its inventory, the PLAAF does 
not train in the doctrine necessary to become an effective air force. First, the lack of flight 
training, only 130 hours a year, does not permit the combat maneuvering necessary to 
win air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Second, the PLAAF’s inability to refuel in-
flight greatly diminishes its ability to conduct sustained combat operations.241 Finally, the 
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PLAAF’s reluctance to conduct over-the-water flights, due to the inherent dangers, seems 
to ensures that the ROC can maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Until each of 
these doctrinal issues is addressed, the PLAAF is expected to remain limited in its ability 
to conduct effective combat operations against Taiwan. 
C. SECOND ARTILLERY CORPS 
 The PLA’s Second Artillery Corps is the most modern force in the PLA. When 
the other services downsized, the Second Artillery Corps grew both in size and budget. 
The PRC is preparing its SMF for possible U.S. involvement during reunification 
operations. To do so, the Second Artillery Corps will maintain a large quantity of 
conventional and nuclear missiles in its inventory.  
 The Second Artillery Corps conventional missile inventory is the PRC’s primary 
tool to coerce Taiwan’s reunification.242 The PRC does not want to use a nuclear missile 
against Taiwan because it seeks the economic prosperity Taiwan can provide when the 
two territories reunify. By launching a nuclear attack, China would largely negate its 
reunification efforts. Currently, the PRC has 350-400 missiles deployed across from 
Taiwan and that number is expected to rise to approximately 600 by the end of the 
decade. As its missile inventory increases, the Second Artillery Corps is modifying its 
missiles with technology that could provide accurate strikes against the ROC’s C2 
capabilities and reduce collateral damage on Taiwan’s infrastructure.  
 The Second Artillery Corps nuclear missile inventory is the PRC’s primary 
deterrent against the United States. The nuclear missiles in the SMF’s inventory reach as 
far as Japan, Guam and the western United States. Also, with a long-range SLBM in 
development, the PRC could potentially strike anywhere in the United States with very 
little alert from U.S. early warning systems.  
 The use of a missile defense system on Taiwan will continue to be a controversial 
matter between the United States and the PRC. The PRC states that a BMD system on 
Taiwan would lead to missile proliferation and would be detrimental to peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, China is adamant that a continued desire by the 
United States to deploy a BMD system on Taiwan would have a negative effect on U.S.-
                                                 





PRC relations. The United States, however, believes the deployment of a BMD system 
can provide Taiwan with the necessary protection against the very credible Chinese 
missile threat.  
D. PLA 
 The PLA is the most neglected branch in the Chinese armed forces. When the 
PRC’s emphasis shifted from land warfare to air warfare, the army was no longer its 
center of attention. Although the army still receives a significant portion of the defense 
budget, the money goes to maintenance costs and not modernization. To aid in 
modernization efforts, the PRC reduced the army to 1.6 million, but it has continuously 
used those liberated funds for modernization in the other services. However, the PLA has 
begun limited efforts to transform into a lighter, more mechanized force capable of 
responding to a crisis more quickly and effectively. 
 The PLA has initiated three efforts to become a more mobile and responsive 
fighting force. First, the PLA has formed Fist units for rapid deployment to areas 
throughout China and to conduct initial attacks against Taiwan. However, the PRC has 
failed to form a Fist unit in each of its 20 group armies due to a lack of dedicated training. 
The PLA is also attempting to utilize SOF, in conjunction with Fist units, to conduct 
psychological operations against Taiwan and to deny ROC forces intelligence 
information during the first phases of an assault.243 Second, the PLA has purchased 
Russian IFVs in an effort to transport its regular infantry forces faster and more 
efficiently into combat. However, these IFVs have only been issued to Fist units, not the 
regular infantry, thereby negating the sole reason for purchasing the IFVs. Finally, the 
PRC is purchasing and developing MBTs that are not only fast, but carry a wide variety 
of advanced payloads capable of successfully engaging U.S. and ROC MBTs. However, 
these efforts are currently meaningless against Taiwan due to the PRC’s continually 
inadequate amphibious and transport capabilities.   
E. OPTIONS FOR THE TAIWAN STRAIT 
 The PRC wants nothing less than reunification with Taiwan. If a peaceful 
resolution is not achieved, China has two viable scenarios for aggressive reunification. 
                                                 




An amphibious assault may allow China to reunify, but at a tremendous cost to both 
China and Taiwan. When hostilities end, China would not be in possession of an 
economically vibrant Taiwan, but instead a mere shadow of its former self. However, 
with a naval blockade, China is presented with several advantages. First, Taiwan does not 
have time to decide on what to do about a blockade. Supplies on Taiwan are limited, and 
would force the ROC government may be forced to decide quickly between letting its 
citizens to starve or escalating the situation and fighting the PRC. Second, by calling the 
blockade a quarantine, the PRC can create legal ambiguity. The PRC can blockade 
Taiwan without declaring war, however, if a PRC ship enforcing the blockade were 
attacked, then that would be an act of war.244 Finally, due to the legal ambiguity of the 
naval quarantine, the PRC gains time to maintain its blockade while the international 
community resorts to diplomatic means to stop the PRC. 
 PRC planners are developing strategies for a U.S. intervention against Chinese 
operations around Taiwan. The PRC recognizes that it must resort to asymmetric 
methods to defeat technologically advanced force and intends to exploit the U.S. reliance 
on technology. By doing so, the PRC intends to deny U.S. forces the ability to gather 
intelligence and maintain effective C2 during operations around Taiwan. Also, the PRC 
intends to use computer attacks on installations against both the United States and 
Taiwan. The PRC hopes that a computer attack on financial markets, communication 
networks and power grids would cause enough confusion to force indecision and thereby 
allow the PRC to complete its operations against Taiwan before the United States could 
effectively respond.  
F.  SUMMARY 
 The PRC’s military modernization is focused on fighting future wars. The PRC 
has purchased advanced foreign equipment and is developing technology designed to 
transform the PLA into a more mobile, technologically advanced fighting force. In the 
past twenty years, Beijing has reduced its military manpower, increased its defense 
budget and forced modernization on its military. Through detailed analysis of U.S. 
military campaigns in the Middle East and the Balkans, the PRC is overhauling each of 
                                                 




its armed services to use many of the lessons already learned by the U.S. military. The 
PRC is developing advanced air and naval fleets to operate against U.S. and ROC forces 
in the Taiwan Strait. Also, the PRC is dedicated to maintaining a large quantity of 
missiles aimed at both the United States and Taiwan. While both are effective deterrents, 
neither provides the PRC with an overall increase in strength. 
The PRC’s modernization is a haphazard process and is focused on too few areas 
that will raise its overall strength. While modernizing its air force and missile fleet, the 
PRC is neglecting to modernize its infantry, build an adequate amphibious fleet, and train 
its forces on the doctrine necessary for sustained combat operations against Taiwan. Also, 
the PRC is plagued by China’s inability to mass produce any of the foreign acquisition it 
receives, thereby leading to a potential lack of replacements and a reluctance to operate 
many of its advanced acquisitions. The PRC has made significant strides for its military 
to become a modern force, but not enough to augment its overall strength to successfully 
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